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Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy 
ALICE G. ABRElf 
Any distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is 
overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual persons over 
time. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax systems can give, even as they are taking away. What tax 
systems can give is power, and the power they can give is of different 
kinds. First, a tax system can give people2 the power to avoid the 
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I. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 164 (1974). I want to thank 
Professor Steve Rieber for bringing this statement to my attention. Steve Rieber, 
Freedom and Redistributive Taxation, 10 PUB. AFF. Q. 63 (1996). 
2. As even economists have long acknowledged, all taxes are ultimately paid by 
people. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 103D CONG., !ST SESS., METHODOLOGY 
AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS, JCS-7-
93, 20 (I 993) [hereinafter JCT PAMPHLET]. Thus, even taxes nominally imposed on 
entities or other jural persons are actually paid by people, although the identity of those 
people might be difficult to ascertain. The development and application of the 
microeconomic discipline of distributional analysis, which is devoted to determining how 
the tax burden is actually distributed among income classes, is discussed in more detail 
in Part IV. 
imposition of all or part of the tax.3 A system that grants such power 
does so by attaching different consequences to different behavioral 
choices. The federal income tax offers many such choices--a head tax 
would offer almost none. 
Second, a tax system can give people the power to shift the economic 
burden of the tax to someone else.4 A tax system so designed gives the 
bearer of the nominal burden the choice of either shifting or retaining the 
economic burden of the tax.5 A system that taxes corporate entities 
gives the entity the choice of shifting the burden of the tax to any one 
3. Under a system that grants such power, choosing one type of behavior would 
result in the payment of X amount in tax, while choosing another type of behavior would 
result in the payment of X plus (or minus) Y amount in tax. A system that requires 
realization illustrates the importance of the ability to choose. Under such a system, a 
taxpayer who owns a share of stock purchased for $ I but now worth $10 I will have no 
income as a result of that appreciation (unless the taxpayer is a dealer in securities and 
the mark to market rules of I.R.C. § 475 apply) if she chooses to retain the share. She 
will owe no federal income tax with respect to her ownership of the share and X will 
therefore equal 0. By contrast, if the taxpayer chooses to sell the share for $ 10 I, she 
will have income of $100 and will have to pay tax on that income. Her federal income 
tax liability will therefore be X + Y, where Y is the amount of tax attributable to the sale 
of the share. Of course, realization is not an inevitable component of any tax system, 
even an income tax system. See Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization, Accretion 
Taxation, The Constitution. Macomber. and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. I (1993); 
David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, I 34 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986); Victor Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate Income-A 
Proposal for Reform, 2 AM. J. OF TAX POL'Y 109 (1983); Mark L. Louie, Note, 
Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable 
Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982); Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming December I 996); cf Dan Subotnik, On 
Constructively Realizing Constructive Realization: Building the Case for Death and 
Taxes, 38 KAN. L. REV. I (1989); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 361 (1993); Charles 0. Galvin, Taxing Gains at Death: A Further Comment, 
46 V AND. L. REV. 1525 ( 1993 ). See generally Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion 
Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. I 817 (I 990). 
4. See infra part IV. In particular, see text accompanying notes 23, 50-54, for an 
explanation and discussion of the differences between the nominal and economic burdens 
of a tax. 
5. Traditional economic analysis proceeds as if the burden is shifted because it 
must be shifted, that is, as if behaving so as to maximize immediate economic gain is 
a law as inexorable as the law of gravity. I disagree. The decision to maximize 
immediate economic gain proceeds from the existence of a choice to do so, as I develop 
more fully in part IV.C. 
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of a number of potential bearers.6 A system of taxing shareholders on 
corporate income as accrued would curtail that choice.7 
6. Even though the corporate income tax has been a part of the federal income 
tax system for nearly a century ( a federal tax was imposed on the income of corporations 
in 1909), economists still do not know who actually pays it. They agree that corporations 
are merely the creatures of state law, and, as such, cannot actually bear the burden of 
the tax. Some individual must actually suffer its imposition, but economists cannot 
agree on who those individuals are. Thus, it is possibie that the tax is shifted to the 
providers of labor, in the form of lower wages, to the providers of capital, in the form 
of smaller returns, to consumers, in the form of higher prices, to suppliers, in the form 
of lower prices paid for materials, or to some combination of all of these. For analysis 
of the problem of determining the incidence of the corporate income tax, including a 
discussion of the difficulty of defining the concept of incidence itself, see William A. 
Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem 
in Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 602 nn.104-07 (1965). See generally JCT 
PAMPHLET, supra note 2; MARIAN KRzYZANIAK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE 
SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL 
TAX POLICY 141-46 (5th ed. 1987); J. Gregory Ballentine, The Incidence of a 
Corporation Income Tax in a Growing Economy, 86 J. POL. ECON. 863 (I 978); John G. 
Cragg et al., Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 75 
J. POL ECON. 811 (1967); Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and 
Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms 
Produce the Same Good, 97 J. POL. ECON. 749 (1989); Arnold C. Harberger, The 
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962); Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, Tax Incidence, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 1043, 1050-65 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987); George 
Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime, 44 
TAX L. REV. I, 18-39 (1989). For a cognitively-based explanation of the persistence of 
the corporate income tax notwithstanding the inability to ascertain the identity of its 
bearers, see Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 
I 883-86 ( 1994 ). 
7. Such a system is just one of a number of proposed designs for integrating the 
corporate and individual income taxes, and much scholarly attention has been paid to 
these designs. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Proposals of the American Law Institute 
on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on Corporate Distribu-
tions, A.L.I. FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C (1982); Reporter's Study Draft: 
Subchapter C (Supplemental Study), in A.L.I. FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT (1989); Alvin 
C. Warren Jr., Reporter's Study of Corporate Tax Integration, AL.I. FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PROJECT (1993); Krister Andersson, Implications of Integrating Corporate and 
Shareholder Taxes, 50 TAX NOTES 1523 (1991); Ernest S. Christian, Jr., Integrating 
Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, 48 TAX NOTES 1519 (1990); Peter L. Faber, Taxation 
of Corporations and Shareholders: Premises of the Present System, 22 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 5 (1985); John K. McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income Tax by Integration 
of the Corporate Income Tax, 46 TAX NOTES 1445 (1990); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate 
Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the 
Future, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237 (1990); George K. Yin, Achieving Corporate Integration 
Through Double Taxation, 56 TAX NOTES 1365 (1992); George K. Yin, A Different 
Approach to the Taxation of Corporate Distributions: Theory and Implementation of a 
Uniform Corporate-Level Distributions Tax, 78 GEO. L.J. 1837 (1990); cf Jeffrey L. 
3 
That tax systems attach consequences to the exercise of taxpayer 
choice is not news. Legislatures have long recognized that taxpayers can 
choose between various courses of action and have often used the 
existence of choice as an instrument of social or economic policy. 8 
Courts and commentators have struggled with what can accurately be 
characterized as the abuse of choice--taxpayer attempts to cast 
transactions in a particular form devoid of business purpose or sub-
stance-and have filled many pages trying to develop talismanic 
formulae for distinguishing acceptable use from unacceptable abuse.9 
Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. 
L. REV. 613 (1990) (questioning the prudence of corporate integration in light of 
equitable and revenue-based concerns); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the 
Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (1988-89) 
(proposing the redesign of the corporate income tax as a viable alternative to corporate 
integration). 
8. For a recent and thoughtful illustration of this concept, see Michael Livingston, 
Risky Business: Economics. Culture and the Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX 
L. REV. 163 (1993). For a good synopsis of the literature on the merits of and policies 
inherent in the use of the tax law to foster particular choices, see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 
(I 986). 
9. See. e.g., Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income 
Taxation, 34 U. Clll. L. REV. 485 (I 966-67); Yitzhak Hadari, Tax Avoidance in Linear 
Transactions: The Dilemma of Tax Systems, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 59 (1994); 
Joseph Jsenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. C111. L. REV. 859, 
864-82 (1982); Geoffrey J. Lanning, The Real-Politik of Taxation: Substance and Form, 
Tax "Lawmaking", and the Basic Tax Ideologies, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1485 (1988); Saul 
Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. IO 19 ( I 988); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measure-
ment, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 382-83 (1988); Lee A. Sheppard, Substance over Form in 
Subchapter C, 44 TAX NOTES 642 (I 989). 
Drawing the line between acceptable, and indeed, intended, use and unacceptable, 
unintended abuse has always been difficult. In general, I would consider abusive any 
attempt at reaping benefits that the Legislature did not intend to bestow. I would 
consider as acceptable any transaction that carried out the Legislature's intended purpose. 
For me, detennining the Legislature's purpose is crucial and it does not surprise me that 
the debate about the role of purpose, and the manner in which purpose is ascertained, 
has garnered the attention of tax scholars. See Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax 
Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 ( 1995); Deborah A. Geier, 
Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 448 n.8, 456 (1993); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Text, Purpose, Capacity. and Albertson's: A Response to Professor 
Geier, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 717 (I 996). For a comprehensive catalogue of tax scholarship 
on the role of purpose, see Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 
supra, at 494 n.5, and Geier, Commentary: Textua/ism and Tax Cases, supra, at 448 
n.8, 456 n.42. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1995); Richard K. Greenstein, Text as Tool: Why We Read the Law, 
52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 105 (1995). 
An illustration of the way I distinguish between use and abuse might be helpful. I 
consider an individual's purchase of municipal bonds, the interest on which is exempt 
from federal income tax under I.R.C. § 103, to be an acceptable use of the tax system. 
Such an individual purchaser is doing precisely what the Legislature intended-loaning 
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Public finance economists have kept countless computers busy trying to 
track and predict the consequences of the exercise of choice, that is, 
determining the likely distribution of the tax burden. 10 What legisla-
tures and public finance economists have failed to do, and what 
commentators have done entirely too little of, is engage in a critical 
appraisal of the values implicated by the existence of varying amounts 
of choice. 11 An analysis of the ways in which tax systems confer and 
distribute power is long overdue. 12 
money to an entity under circumstances which allow that entity to pay less than a market 
rate for the money. By contrast, I think that Evelyn Gregory engaged in unacceptable 
abuse when she caused her wholly owned corporation to transfer Monitor shares to 
Averill and then caused the liquidation of Averill. Gregory v. Helvering, 27 B.T.A. 223 
(1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), ajf'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Mrs. Gregory's 
actions were abusive because the benefits of what is now I.R.C. § 355 were not intended 
to apply to a transaction without a business purpose. 
10. See, e.g., Do TAXES MATTER? (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, 
TAX REFORM, THE RICH AND THE POOR (2d ed. 1989); How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981); THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 3-84 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); HORST C. 
RECKTENWALD, TAX INCIDENCE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION (Stolper trans., 1971). 
11. Notable exceptions are Sheldon D. Pollack, whose May 18, 1995 testimony 
before the Senate Finance Committee, as well as his prior published work, notes the 
relationship between values and tax system design, (Sheldon D. Pollack, The Flat Tax: 
A Dissenting View, reprinted in 67 TAX NOTES 1253 (1995); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax 
Reform: The /980's in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489 (1991)), Donna M. Byrne, who 
has used philosophical notions of fairness to appraise progressive taxation (Donna M. 
Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1995)), and Marjorie 
Kornhauser, who has analyzed progressivity from a feminist perspective, (Marjorie 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical 
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987)). As Professor Pollack has pithily 
observed, "intellectual honesty requires that assertions such as that the income tax ought 
to be either flat or progressive need to be justified in terms of moral and ethical 
principles." Pollack, The Flat Tax, supra, at 1254. More recently, Gene Steuerle noted 
the importance of choice by defining "losers" as individuals "whose options might be 
further restricted" under proposed revisions to the Code. Gene Steuerle, The Multiple 
Goals of Tax Reformers, 69 TAX NOTES 231 ( 1995). 
12. Although non-corporeal entities are also subject to taxes, I refer to the 
empowerment of individuals because, in the end, only people pay taxes. See supra note 
2. Only people can make the decisions that will result in the payment of various 
amounts of taxes and shift, and ultimately bear, the economic burden of those taxes. For 
an examination of the latter contention (viewed from a distributional standpoint), see 
Martin Feldstein, Imputing Corporate Tax Liabilities to Individual Taxpayers, 41 NAT'L 
TAX J. 37 ( I 988); cf Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 77-
79 ( 1990) ( arguing that, in any analysis of distributional fairness, non-corporeal entities 
cannot have "income" in the Haig/Simons sense). It is therefore appropriate to focus on 
individuals as the object of empowerment, rather than on the organizations and non-
corporeal entities they might control and through which they might operate. 
5 
The key to this analysis is appreciating that tax systems, like the coins 
in which they are ultimately paid, have two sides. On one side is the 
burden they impose. That side is easy to see and is shared by all tax 
systems. 13 The optimal distribution of the tax burden has long been 
debated and its actual and projected distribution frequently analyzed. 14 
It is the other side of tax systems that is hard to see. On the other side 
is the empowerment that tax systems grant when they give individuals 
the ability to affect either the amount of tax that will be collected or the 
identity of the bearer of the resulting economic burden.15 Because not 
all tax systems empower and because I believe that the extent to which 
a tax system empowers reflects and implements important values, it is 
appropriate to engage in an analysis of the ways in which particular tax 
systems empower and to examine who is empowered. 
The way in which a tax system empowers is, I submit, perhaps even 
more important than the way in which it burdens. There are three 
reasons for this. First, empowerment can affect progressivity, generally 
by reducing it. Traditionally, the negative aspects of a tax system-its 
distribution of burdens--have determined its progressivity. 16 Yet, 
empowerment, which is generally positive, can offset the negative aspect 
13. In Freedom and Redistributive Taxation, Steve Rieber draws on the work of 
Nozick, Gooding, Klymlicka, and Cohen to posit a provocative view of the way in which 
tax systems impose a burden. Rieber argues that taxes constrain "the freedom to 
perform the action that is taxed." Rieber, supra note I, at 63, 64. While I am persuaded 
by the argument that taxes constrain freedom, I disagree with the implication that all 
they do is constrain. This Article attempts to show that a tax system's design can vary 
the degree of constraint by also including the opportunity to exercise choice. Thus, 
while the existence of a gift tax can constrain the freedom to make a gift, as Professor 
Rieber posits, the decision to raise revenue by enacting a gift tax, rather than, say, a 
wealth tax, gives individuals who might be subject to the tax a quantum of power to 
decide on the imposition of the tax that they would lack under a system that taxed 
wealth. 
14. Distributional analysis is a mature discipline replete with tools for measuring 
the distribution of the tax burden and enriched by debate about the adequacy of those 
tools and the desirability of particular outcomes. See infra Part IV.A. 
15. Of course, the notion that law can empower is not new. Indeed, it is at the 
root of H. L. A. Hart's attack on Austin's positivist view of law. H. L. A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 40-4 l ( 1961 ). Hart considered law to be more than a set of 
commands that impose duties (the Austinian commands of the sovereign). Rather, he 
considered law to be a system that allows individuals to engage in acts (like contracting 
for behavior that will take place in the future) that they would not be able to do in its 
absence. In Hart's view, the law of contract empowers by providing assurances of things 
to come. Those assurances free individuals to enter into transactions and expect results 
that would not exist in their absence. Thus, like the tax law, the law of contracts 
empowers, even as it constrains. Id. 
16. See infra note 3 7 and accompanying text. 
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of the burden. 17 Empowerment can therefore reduce the net burden 
imposed by a tax system, and, by doing so, reduce its overall 
progressivity. 18 To analyze the distributive impact of a system in its 
entirety, tax policy should ask not only how much the system takes away 
and from whom (the burden side of the progressivity equation), but also 
how much it gives and to whom (the benefits side of a new progressivity 
equation). In other words, tax policy should move from a consideration 
of gross burdens to a consideration of net burdens. 19 To do this, tax 
policy must analyze the ways in which tax systems empower and must 
identify who they empower. Whether the result is a different measure 
of progressivity or the addition of another concept separate from and 
additional to progressivity is a matter for further development. 
Second, empowerment can affect the visibility, and consequently the 
accountability, of a tax system. When a system places its burden on 
someone who has the power to shift that burden, it effectively taxes 
people who will often not know that they are being taxed-or at least 
they will not know that they are being taxed until they take one or more 
courses in microeconomics. Taxation that is invisible is even worse than 
taxation without representation.20 One cannot rebel against, much less 
17. As I discuss more fully in Part II, although the grant of the power to choose 
is not necessarily positive, in the context of a system of taxation the grant of such power 
is largely positive. 
18. Basic algebra confirms that a positive factor, when added to a negative factor, 
reduces the size of the negative factor and produces a net figure that is less negative than 
the original negative alone. To illustrate, - 4 + 2 = -2. I would rather be at -2 than -4, 
even if, ideally, I would prefer to be at or above 0. If the burden of the tax is the -4 and 
empowerment is the +2, basic algebra illustrates how empowerment can reduce the net 
burden. To obtain a complete picture of the distribution of the tax burden, the -2 's, the 
net, and not the -4' s, the gross, should be distributed. Yet, current tax policy distributes 
the -4's and does not even acknowledge the existence of the +2's. Perhaps this is 
because the positive factors cannot easily be measured in numbers. Nevertheless, the 
difficulty of assigning a number to the factor as an empirical matter should not detract 
from the desirability of taking the factor into account as a conceptual matter. 
19. As I discuss more fully in Part II.A., the netting process that I propose and that 
I illustrated in note 18, supra, is not precise, at least not with traditional measurement 
techniques, because the burden can be measured in dollars while the benefit cannot. 
20. Adam Smith listed that which I now call visibility as the second of four 
maxims that he thought should apply to taxes in general. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 362 {1952). Smith's 
second maxim began by stating that "[t]he tax which each individual is bound to pay 
ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the 
quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other 
person." Id. Perhaps anticipating Doemberg and McChesney's work more than a 
7 
attempt to change or reform, that which one does not know is there. 
That economists may be able to ascertain where the burden eventually 
lands and then convey that knowledge to the appropriate elected 
officials, should be scant comfort to anyone who believes that, as a 
normative matter, people ought to know the magnitude of the contribu-
tion their government is asking them to make.21 
Third, but perhaps most importantly, empowerment vests in private 
individuals the authority to decide how the burden of a tax shall be 
allocated. This can affect the distribution of burdens within a tax 
system. In a tax system where the nominal burden of paying the tax 
coincides with its economic burden, the government decides who pays 
and how much they pay. By contrast, in a tax system that permits the 
economic burden to be shifted, the nominal bearer decides who bears 
the economic burden as well as how much burden they bear.22 Under 
such a system, taxation proceeds, at least proximately, from the nominal 
bearer's exercise of her power to shift the economic burden of the tax. 
Such a system has great potential for treating similarly situated 
individuals differently, something that policy-makers ought seriously to 
consider. Good tax system design should eschew, not ensure, capricious 
taxation. 
Because the grant of the power to choose can affect who is taxed and 
how much they are taxed, an analysis of the ways in which tax systems 
empower and a determination of who it is that they empower should 
century later, Smith continued by noting that "[ w ]here it is otherwise, every person 
subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either 
aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such 
aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself." Id.; see also Richard L. Doernberg 
& Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax 
Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987). 
In his pioneering article on the relationship between cognitive theory and the tax law, 
Professor Ed McCaffery discusses the visibility of taxes from another perspective and 
suggests that hidden taxes are effective precisely because they are hidden. McCaffery, 
supra note 6, at 1875-76. 
21. Relying on the willingness of legislators to enact provisions consistent with a 
particular distributional policy is satisfactory only if one is willing to trust them to 
behave, unchecked, in ways that are consistent with one's own distributional policies. 
It is also highly paternalistic. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; see also 
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995); 
McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1935-36. Indeed, public knowledge of the tax burden may 
be an important part of maintaining the accountability of public officials. Ironically, that 
same knowledge argues against the adoption of "return free" systems and other 
simplification measures that would render the income tax significantly less visible than 
it is now. 
22. As I discuss more fully in part IV.C., shifting the economic burden of taxation 
involves the exercise of choice. That economists can predict how numbers of individuals 
will exercise that choice and the degree to which they will exercise it does not abrogate 
the existence of the choice. 
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become a standard part of tax policy analysis. A review of the current 
federal tax system reveals that the system grants many choices, but that 
it generally grants those choices to people who possess material wealth. 
It seems to distribute choices progressively, just as it does burdens. 
Although empowerment cannot be measured in dollars, its grant to the 
wealthy reinforces certain values and has important political, social, and 
psychological effects. Those effects color the public perception of the 
tax system and affect relationships between individuals and perhaps even 
the way individuals view themselves. 
Part II of this Article shows that traditional tax policy analysis has 
hitherto proceeded on the assumption that tax systems impose burdens 
and introduces two concepts that can lead to a more complete analysis 
of tax system design: avoidance power and burden power. Parts III and 
IV then explore these two concepts in more detail. Part V uses the two 
most significant tax systems in this country, the federal income tax 
system and the federal employment tax (social security) system, to bring 
both concepts together and to illustrate how an examination of the ways 
in which specific tax systems empower and an identification of who the 
systems empower, can permit an analysis of the values that inhere in tax 
system design. Part VI examines the relationship between empowerment 
and values, and Part VII concludes by suggesting that the analysis of 
choice developed here could be applied to the ongoing debate regarding 
alternatives to the federal income tax system and should become a 
standard part of tax policy analysis. 
II. BURDENS AND POWERS 
If pessimists are people who look at a half full glass and pronounce 
it half empty, then tax scholars are generally pessimists. Tax scholars 
generally view taxes as burdens, or instruments of removal. Thus, 
public finance economists study how taxes burden individuals, distin-
guishing between such things as the nominal and the economic burden 
of taxes,23 and try to determine how the burden of various types of 
taxes is distributed among the population.24 They also study how taxes 
burden the economy by causing people to change their behavior in ways 
23. See infra Part IV.A. for an explanation and discussion of the concepts of 
nominal and economic burdens. 
24. See infra Part IV.B. for a discussion of distributional analysis. 
9 
inconsistent with the operation of an efficient market, dubbing the 
resulting effects the excess burden of the tax.25 Policy-makers use the 
results of such economic analyses to judge the desirability of various 
taxes.26 
25. Alan Auerbach has defined excess burden, or the deadweight loss from a tax 
system, as "that amount that is lost in excess of what the government collects." l 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC FINANCE ECONOMICS, 67, 61-126 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin 
Feldstein eds., I 985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK). The excess burden of a tax accounts for 
the difference between the amount of revenue that would be raised if people did not alter 
their behavior and the amount of revenue actually raised after the new tax ( or tax 
increase) is in effect, and exists even when the tax is, like a cigarette tax, intended to 
induce the behavioral change. The concept of excess burden explains why a particular 
tax, say, a tax on cigarettes, might raise less revenue than could be predicted by taking 
the amount of the tax proposed for each pack, say, 5 cents, and simply multiplying it by 
the number of packs sold in the year preceding the enactment of the tax, say, I 00 units. 
Economists assert that the number derived from that simple calculation-in this case, 5 
dollars--will almost certainly be greater than the amount of tax actually raised because 
fewer packs will be sold following the enactment of the tax. See Bruce Bartlett, 
Cigare/le Taxes, Smuggling, and Revenues, 63 TAX NOTES 1493 (1994). Some people 
will buy fewer, or even no packs of cigarettes to avoid the payment of the tax, while 
others might choose to buy cigarettes on the black market. Id. at 1496. Both of these 
behavioral responses will cause the government to lose not only the tax revenue it could 
have collected from the unsold packs, but any additional tax revenue it would have 
collected on account of the profit the sellers of the cigarettes would have made by 
selling those unsold packs. That the tax burdens the economy is evident. Id. at 1498. 
The excess burden of a tax is not just the cost of the tax payment remitted to the 
government. As Daniel Shaviro has pointed out, "[a]ny economist worth his salt can 
tolerantly shrug his shoulders about high tax payments, pointing out that such payments 
are merely transfers from one person's individual bank account to society's collective 
bank account, rather than overall losses that diminish society's monetary wealth." 
Daniel N. Shaviro, State and Local Taxation: The Current Judicial Outlook, 22 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 279 {] 993). Steve Rieber makes a similar point about the freedom that one 
person loses when a particular activity is taxed. Rieber, supra note l. Rather, the 
excess burden is the distortional effect of the tax--that is, the extent to which the 
existence of the tax causes people to engage in behavior that they would not otherwise 
engage in. See JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 26-29. For an explanation of the 
development of the concept of excess burden, see 1 HANDBOOK, supra, at 61-126. 
26. A debate over the extent to which revenue estimates should be "dynamic," that 
is, take into account likely behavioral effects, rather than "static," that is, fail to take into 
account such effects, has raged in recent years. Some parties to the debate have argued 
that revenue estimates are static and thus irrelevant, others have argued that even if 
dynamic, revenue estimates are not dynamic enough because they hold certain 
macroeconomic variables constant, and still others have maintained that any attempt at 
dynamism is tantamount to alchemy. For a representative and recent sampling of the 
literature on this debate, see Graetz, supra note 21, at 668-77; Kenneth J. Kies, The 
Revenue Estimating Process-Letting in the Light and Letting Out the Hot Air, 69 TAX 
NOTES 373 {I 995); Economists Continue to Square Off Over "Dynamic" Scoring, 69 
TAX NOTES 275 (1995); Testimony given at HEARINGS held on January 11, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, 95 TNT 7-10, 7-16, 7-32, 7-33, 7-34, 7-35, 7-36, 7-40, 7-41, 7-42, 
7-43, 7-44; Economists Discourage GOP From Adopting 'Dynamic' Scoring, 66 TAX 
NOTES 303 ( 1995). 
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Not surprisingly, traditional tax policy analysis has also proceeded 
from the notion that taxes are burdens. Students of tax policy have 
endeavored to ascertain the extent to which a tax system achieves the 
goals of equity, efficiency, and simplicity.27 Implicit in each of these 
goals is a view of tax systems as the purveyors of burdens. 
Equity has two dimensions: horizontal and vertical.28 Horizontal 
equity follows from the view that those with equal ability to pay should 
bear equal tax burdens. Vertical equity follows from the view that the 
tax burden should rise as ability to pay rises.29 Both concepts address 
the distribution of burdens, not blessings. 
The desire for efficiency also proceeds from a view of taxes as 
burdens. A tax is judged to be more or less efficient depending on the 
degree to which it interferes with the allocation of resources in the 
27. While a complete listing would probably include ability to raise revenue, ease 
of administration and other factors, scholars most often cite the goals of equity, 
efficiency, and simplicity, perhaps as a proxy for a more complete analysis. See 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 30-35 (3d ed. 1995). For the more complete listing, see Joseph Sneed, 
The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965). 
28. The use of ability to pay as a criterion for tax system design harkens back at 
least to Adam Smith, who urged that "[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute 
towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their 
respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy 
under the protection of the state." SMITH, supra note 20, at 361. While the notion of 
ability to pay is most frequently cited in support of a system of progressive taxation, it 
is equally (and perhaps even more accurately) cited in support of a system of 
proportional (or flat) taxation. For a critique of the use of ability to pay as a standard 
for taxation, see JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 50 ( 1985) and Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A 
Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. 
J. TAX PoL'Y 221 (1995). Nevertheless, as Professor Graetz has noted, "[t]he ability-to-
pay criterion enjoys broad acceptance as a fundamental tenet of tax justice, although the 
details of its implementation are controversial." Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled 
Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851,861 (1987). 
29. During the past decade, a rich debate has erupted on the question whether the 
concept of horizontal equity is really different from the concept of vertical equity. Louis 
Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search ofa Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 
(1989); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 
(1990); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, I FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); 
Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note I FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); 
Paul A. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kap/ow Exchange, I FLA. TAX REV. 605 (1993). Regardless of who is finally 
regarded as the winner of this debate (if anyone ever is), it is still the case that, 
traditionally, horizontal and vertical equity have been regarded as desiderata in tax 
policy. 
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economy. The less a tax interferes, the more efficient, and thus the 
more desirable, it is.30 Only a view that something is burdensome 
accounts for the conclusion that less of it is better. 
The desire for simplicity also stems from the notion of taxes as 
burdens. Complex systems are less desirable than simple systems 
because they are more burdensome. They take more time to learn and 
are more costly to administer than simple systems. Complex systems are 
also more burdensome for another, rarely acknowledged, reason: they 
offer more opportunity for the exercise of choice. Although having 
choice is often good, it is not free. As I discuss more fully in Part 
VI.A., the existence of choice carries with it the need to acquire 
knowledge about the available choices and the assumption of responsibil-
ity for its ultimate exercise. 
Tax systems can provide the opportunity to exercise two qualitatively 
different kinds of choices. First, a tax system can give taxpayers the 
ability to make choices that will affect the amount of taxes they will 
pay.31 Because taxpayers who can exercise that type of choice have the 
power to avoid liability for all or part of a tax by changing their 
behavior, I will refer to the power to choose such a course of conduct 
as avoidance power. People with avoidance power benefit even if they 
choose not to exercise that power. The power to choose is important in 
and of itself. 
Second, a tax system can place the nominal burden of the tax on 
parties with the power to shift the economic burden elsewhere. People 
with such power must, of course, choose whether to exercise it. Their 
choice determines who ultimately bears the economic burden of the tax. 
I will refer to the power to shift the economic burden of the tax as 
burden power. 
These two powers do not exist in independent spheres. Because an 
individual can exercise burden power so as to avoid the economic 
burden of the tax, burden power could be seen as but one application of 
avoidance power. Nevertheless, the powers are qualitatively different 
and therefore benefit from separate analysis. 
30. The theory of optimal taxation seeks to establish the point at which 
government can raise the maximum amount of revenue while creating the minimum 
excess burden. 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 86. The easiest way to solve the 
problem of optimal taxation is to enact taxes that do not distort behavior. Auerbach 
posits a tax on pure profits as such a tax and suggests that, at least theoretically, one 
could design a non-distortionary progressive tax on genetic characteristics associated 
with ability. He recognizes, however, the practical impossibility of actually enacting 
such a tax. Id. 
31. This includes the power to reduce that level to zero, that is, to avoid imposition 
of the tax altogether. 
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The power to shift the burden of the tax differs qualitatively from the 
power to avoid it for two reasons. First, a person who avoids the 
imposition of the tax by exercising avoidance power avoids both the 
nominal and economic burdens of the tax. By contrast, a person who 
can only avoid the economic burden of the tax by shifting it retains the 
nominal burden. Such a person retains the compliance obligations as 
well as the primary liability for payment of the tax, and must endure any 
economic conseqences that attend the shift. Second, bestowing on 
certain individuals the power to shift has policy implications that are 
different from, and perhaps more disturbing than, the policy implications 
of bestowing only the power to avoid. While an exercise of avoidance 
power will simply result in the collection of fewer taxes, leaving 
government to decide how else to raise revenue, exercising burden 
power allows the nominal taxpayer to decide who will pay the amount 
that she is unwilling to provide. 32 Burden power thus differs from 
avoidance power because burden power privatizes the decision of who 
will pay and hides the very existence of the tax. I will discuss these 
issues further in Part IV. 
Ill. AVOIDANCE POWER: CHOICE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
MAGNITUDE OF THE TAX BURDEN 
A. The Value of Personal Autonomy 
Whether a tax system gives those who are subject to it any avoidance 
power depends on its design. For instance, a head tax provides little 
avoidance power, but a tax on champagne gives individuals the power 
to avoid the tax by refraining from purchasing champagne, or by 
purchasing bootleg champagne. The champagne tax is high in avoidance 
power because individuals could avoid it completely by changing their 
32. To the extent that the government imposes taxes to raise revenue, it is possible 
to argue that any avoidance has the effect of an indirect shift. As long as the 
government needs to raise X amount of revenue, if person A pays X-Y, it is reasonable 
to posit that the government will have to raise Y from another source. The difference 
between this type of burden shifting and the type of burden shifting I will discuss in 
Parts III and IV involves the question of who decides. If the government decides to 
raise Y from source Z, that decision will be made by the government. If, instead, person 
A exercises her power to shift so that person B ends up bearing the economic burden of 
the tax rather than person A, it is person A who decides that B should pay, not the 
government, at least not directly. 
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behavior at an acceptable cost--the cost of not consuming legal 
champagne. A head tax is low in avoidance power because taxpayers 
cannot avoid it without incurring unacceptably high costs--the loss of 
life, or expatriation and the loss of citizenship and community.33 
The design of a tax system, including the extent to which it confers 
avoidance power, reflects the values of its designers. Tax systems, after 
all, do not follow the laws of nature. The design of a tax system is not 
ordained by anything even remotely analogous to the law of gravity. 34 
33. Avoidance that results from a change in behavior that changes the status of an 
individual from one subject to the tax to one not subject to the tax is not only 
conceptually permissible but is actually intended by the design of the system. A system 
that taxes the purchase of champagne allows individuals to avoid the imposition of the 
tax by assuming the status of non-purchasers rather than of purchasers. Few would 
seriously contend that a person who refrains from becoming a purchaser of champagne 
solely to avoid the tax thereon should nevertheless be subject to the tax because her 
motivation was avoidance of the tax and not a distaste for champagne. The power to 
choose behaviors (buying champagne and paying the tax or not buying champagne and 
not paying the tax) is part of the fabric of the system, and it would be wrong to punish 
a taxpayer for exercising a choice that the system gives her. The failure to recognize 
that tax systems can empower by their design leads to confusion regarding the legitimacy 
of choices exercised by taxpayers. The effects of this confusion are nowhere more 
evident than in the recent proposals to tax United States citizens who renounce their 
citizenship to avoid the payment offederal taxes. The Senate introduced an expatriation 
proposal (a revised version of an earlier proposal by the Clinton administration) as an 
amendment to the Self-Employed Persons Health Care Deduction Extension Act of 1995, 
H.R. 831, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Although the amendment was ultimately 
defeated, the Senate did include in the final version of H.R. 831 an amendment requiring 
the Joint Committee to study the expatriate tax issue further. Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 6, 
109 Stat. 93 (1995). The Senate amendments to H.R. 831 (both the defeated tax 
proposal and the enacted "study" proposal and the many variations that have been 
proposed since then) reflect the widespread view that expatriates ought to be taxed in 
a way that neither United States citizens nor non-resident aliens are taxed; that they are 
doing something that the system did not intend for them to be able to do. That 
something is to choose whether to be subject to the tax laws of the United States. Yet, 
our system provides that choice. Although some people do not have a choice regarding 
the acquisition of United States citizenship because they are born here, all of us have a 
choice regarding its retention. The possession of United States citizenship is not 
meaningless. Citizenship carries with it a number of benefits, as well as a number of 
burdens. Those who are willing to give up the benefits should be permitted to shed the 
burdens as well. Recognizing the degree to which tax systems, by design, provide for 
the exercise of choice would allow us to distinguish between the appropriate and 
expected exercise of choice and its abuse. For an illustration of how the analysis 
developed here can be used to illuminate the issues regarding the taxation of 
expatriation, see Alice G. Abreu, The Difference Between Expatriates and Mrs. Gregory: 
Citizenship Can Matter, 67 TAX NOTES 692 (1995), reprinted in 10 TAX NOTES INT'L 
1612 (1995), and Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (1996) 
( also summarizing the fate of the numerous proposals to change the taxation of 
expatriates). 
34. In a recent article, Professor John Miller draws upon the work of John Rawls 
to argue that tax laws, like the rules of baseball, are creational because their enactment 
"creates something that did not exist before." John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, 
Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 
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WASH. L. REV. I, 69 n.319 (1993) (citing John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. 
REV. 3, 24-29 (1955)). Professor Miller, drawing on the Rawlsian notion that rules lead 
to the formation of practices and thus define the practice, goes further and posits that tax 
laws are even more "creational" ( or constitutive) than other types of laws. Whereas 
other types of laws address some event or condition that would exist even in their 
absence, or codify an existing or accepted moral imperative, in Professor Miller's view, 
tax laws do neither of those things. Id. 
I disagree with Professor Miller. I would certainly acknowledge that the connection 
between particular tax laws and actions that occur in society irrespective of those laws 
is harder to see than the connection between murder and the laws that proscribe it. The 
connection between tax laws and morality is also not immediately apparent. I do, 
however, believe that the same sort of connection exists. The creation of a tax system 
is an imperative of group (i.e., societal) living. Although tax systems as we now know 
them did not exist in aboriginal societies, systems of communal sharing did. Members 
of numerically small societies share food, protection from the elements, and defense 
against predators. The existence of an organized society implies, by its very definition, 
the existence of different roles for different members of it, and the existence of different 
roles necessitates sharing. A society in which members are expected to share the 
proceeds of a hunt with others is, in effect, imposing a tax upon that hunt. It is not 
outlandish to suspect that in such a society, failure to conform to the norm of sharing 
would be seen as a moral failing and would be punished with ostracism or worse. It is 
also not outlandish to suggest that members of such a society might prefer to keep the 
entire proceeds of the hunt for themselves rather than sharing it with the rest of the 
community. Although the consequences of failing to share would be more direct in such 
societies (e.g., in the form of ostracism or inability to receive other necessities) than in 
societies that have adopted formal systems of taxation which require payment in a 
fungible currency, this does not make the imperative to share any less compelling nor 
the failure to do so any less moral. See, e.g., RICHARD B. LEE, THE DOBE !KUNG, 48-
50, 97-102 (1984); NAPOLEON A. CHAGNON, YANOMAMO-THE FIERCE PEOPLE 7, 34, 
91 (George & Louise Spindler eds., 1968); John A. Price, Sharing, The Integration of 
Intimate Economies, 17 ANTHROPOLOGICA 3, 14, 16 (I 975) (I thank my colleague, Peter 
Sevareid for bringing some of these sources to my attention). In the most basic of 
senses, then, I heartily agree with Justice Holmes that taxes are the price we pay for 
civilization. See infra note 41. Indeed, I might go even further and say that taxation, 
that is, the means by which we share resources, is an essential part of civilization. 
While the existence of a system of taxation is, in my view, an imperative of organized 
societal living, the particular contours of that system reflect the values of those who 
design it. Thus, who will be asked to share and the extent to which they will be asked 
to share depends on what the particular society values. The rules of a tax system, then, 
are unlike the rules of baseball in two ways. First, the behavior in question would exist 
even in the absence of the rules. That is, in an organized society, people would share 
resources. The game called sharing would exist even in the absence of definitive rules 
setting forth its parameters. See LEE, supra, at 48-50. Second, the content of the rules 
reflects shared values. In that sense, the rules of the game of sharing, or of paying 
taxes, do not constitute the behavior. Rather, they describe the values and aspirations 
the society holds. In Rawlsian terms, then, tax laws are not constitutive, they are 
descriptive. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 24-29 (1955). 
In The Transparency of Rules, my colleague, Rick Greenstein, argues that the 
distinction between constitutive and descriptive rules is a false one. Richard K. 
Greenstein, The Transparency of Rules (presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
15 
Unlike the falling of a pebble released from a hand, a particular tax 
system is not the inevitable result of forces which humans can under-
stand, perhaps control and sometimes escape from, but cannot alter. 
Rather, tax systems are products of human creation. They exist because 
they serve human objectives, reflecting the values of their designers. A 
tax system's design can reveal much about those values. In other words, 
our choice of an income tax over a head tax as a mechanism for raising 
revenue is not accidental. 
Values dictate the answer to one of the fundamental questions that any 
tax system must answer: Who decides how much each member of the 
society will pay? While one answer to that question simply points to 
Congress--by enacting the system, it decide&--such an answer fails to 
recognize the ways in which taxpayers themselves might be the decision-
makers. To the extent that taxpayers can alter their tax liability by 
changing their behavior, it is they who decide. Under a system that 
provides opportunities for the exercise of taxpayer choice, even 
taxpayers who choose not to alter their behavior are making a choice 
that affects their tax liability. That is the thesis of this Article: The 
design of a tax system determines who makes the ultimate decision 
about who pays and how much they pay. 
The decision to adopt a tax system that provides opportunities for 
taxpayers to exercise choice, and thus allows them to determine their 
own tax liability, reflects deference to the value of personal autonomy. 
Adoption of the federal income tax system, which confers much 
avoidance power, rather than a head tax system, which would confer 
almost none, reflects the importance of personal autonomy in our socio-
political tradition. 35 
The way in which a tax system distributes the ability to preserve 
personal autonomy implicates deeply held values. A tax system can 
distribute such powers, and whatever burdens they may impose, either 
progressively, regressively, or proportionately. A tax system that 
evidences equal respect for the personal autonomy of all who are subject 
to it would give all who are subject to it the same amount of power. 
Such a system would reflect the value that personal autonomy ought to 
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, April 6, 1996; unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author). The difference, he maintains, is one of degree and 
not of kind, so that, in his view, even the rules of baseball are both descriptive and 
constitutive. In his terms, perhaps all I am saying here is that tax laws are more 
transparent than the rules of baseball. 
35. Personal autonomy is at the root of values that we have elevated to the status 
of rights, such as privacy. See Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169 
(John Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1971), reprinted in P!IlLOSOPHY OF LAW 340 
(Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991). 
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be distributed equally. By contrast, a system that bestowed the greatest 
amount of personal autonomy on those with the greatest amount of 
material wealth would reflect the high value of such wealth. And, a 
system that bestowed the greatest amount of power on those with the 
smallest amount of material wealth would reflect either a disdain for 
such wealth or an attempt to compensate for diminished wealth. Once 
a system is identified as the giver of power, analysis of the distribution 
of that power becomes as imperative as the analysis of the distribution 
of its burdens. 
B. Power and Progressivity 
The distribution of both benefits and burdens affects the progressivity 
of a tax system. Any analysis of one without the other is bound to be 
incomplete. Traditional tax policy analysis has suffered from such 
incompleteness. While traditional tax policy analyzes the distribution of 
the financial burdens of taxation,36 it has failed to analyze the distribu-
tion of the powers that a system of taxation can bestow.37 Traditional 
36. As Donna Byrne has pointed out to me, traditional tax policy analysis is 
incomplete even within the parameters that it sets out to examine because it focuses on 
fiscal burdens. As Professor Byrne maintains, tax systems can impose non-fiscal burdens 
that the traditional analysis simply ignores. See Byrne, supra note 11. 
37. That taxes have traditionally been viewed as creating only burdens is not 
surprising given the perspective of those who have been at the forefront of tax policy 
analysis (i.e., economists who are trained to consider the effects of a tax on the 
economy). From that traditional viewpoint, taxes that induce a change in taxpayer 
behavior reduce market activity and thus burden the economy. All taxes, from this 
perspective, are non-neutral. Nevertheless, to say that all taxes are non-neutral is not to 
say that taxation cannot be used to stimulate economic activity. However, the use of 
taxation to stimulate economic activity typically involves reducing taxes for one type of 
activity over another, which has the effect of creating a preferred class of activity. The 
use of taxation to induce economic activity presupposes the existence of a uniform tax. 
Once the tax is in place, any reduction in it creates a preference. Such a reduction in 
tax is equivalent to an outlay of funds for the activity and is often referred to as a tax 
expenditure. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 705 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied 
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental 
Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The 
Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 
225 ( 1979); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and 
the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679 (1976); Boris I. 
Bittker, Accounting For Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX 
J. 244 (1971); Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure 
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tax policy has thus been unidimensional. It has viewed taxes as the 
creators of burdens to be minimized, equalized, and, ideally, neutral-
ized.38 It has not even noticed that by providing opportunities for the 
exercise of taxpayer choice, tax systems can empower.39 
Budget-A Reply to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (I 969). But see Edward A. 
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of 
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993); but cf Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 564 TEX. 
L. REV. 973 (1986). Analyzing the effect of a reduction in taxes in a world with taxes 
is different from analyzing the effect of the introduction of a tax to a world without 
taxes. The former can induce a particular type of economic activity by creating a 
preference for it, while the latter will necessarily burden whatever activity it is imposed 
upon. It is therefore entirely consistent to say that the introduction of a tax creates a 
non-neutrality which, once created, can be exploited for the purpose of achieving some 
higher economic or social objective. HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 86. 
38. Although consideration of benefits in the study of the distribution of tax 
burdens has sometimes been suggested, the benefits referred to in that context consist 
of government transfer payments, which can also be seen as negative taxes and thus as 
a conceptually necessary part of an analysis of total distribution. See, e.g., CONGRESSIO-
NAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING ENTITLEMENT SPENDING 39-45 (1994); Edgar K. 
Browning, The Burden of Taxation, 86 J. POL. ECON. 649 (1978). See generally HOUSE 
SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOURCES OF 
THE INCREASES IN POVERTY, WORK EFFORT, AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION DATA, WMCP 
No. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53 (Comm. Print 1993) (gauging an entity's economic 
well-being by measuring both its tax burden and its cash, and non-cash, pre-tax 
income--including government transfer payments and employer-provided fringe 
benefits); ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 455 (3d ed. 1985), quoted in Nancy J. 
Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A Response to 
Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1425 n.26 (1988); Graetz, supra note 21, 
at 657-61; Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 492-93 & n.98 (offering a provocative view of 
the relationship between taxes, government welfare payments to the poor, and 
government "welfare payments" to the rich and middle-class). Cf Vladimir Salzyn, 
Designing an Optimal Personal Income Tax Rate Structure: Goals and Criteria, 26 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 577, 586 (1988) (acknowledging that vertical equity cannot be 
analyzed without accounting for government transfer payments, but noting that a 
proportional tax coupled with government transfer payments is not necessarily fair as 
measured against a progressive tax). The relationship between empowerment and the 
decision to effect some transfer payments directly, and others through the tax system, 
is a complex and interesting one, but its exploration must await another day. 
39. It is interesting to note that the excess burden of a tax results from the 
taxpayer's exercise of power. The attribute that leads to the excess burden is the 
behavioral sensitivity of the tax. To the extent that people behave so as to avoid the tax, 
they are also avoiding transactions whose benefits are then lost to the economy, creating 
a deadweight loss. The attribute that creates the bulk of the excess burden, is, then, the 
ability to refrain from engaging in the taxed activity. That ability to refrain exists 
because the taxpayer has the ability to choose to refrain. Thus, the very attribute that 
leads to the excess burden---the ability to choose to refrain from engaging in the 
behavior that gives rise to the tax-also empowers the taxpayer. It gives the taxpayer 
the power to choose to become subject to the tax, or not. 
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There is little question that systems of taxation are, indeed, burden-
some. Few people like to pay taxes,40 as politicians know only too 
well, and many devote considerable amounts of energy to advocating 
their reduction or abolition. But that is not the only possible view of 
taxes. Justice Holmes is reported to have said that "[t]axes are what we 
pay for a civilized society."41 Just as Holmes was able to see positive 
where others saw only negative, so it should be possible to examine 
40. I did, however, once hear of a client who liked his tax bill to be large because 
he saw the size of his tax bill as a reflection of how well he was doing. Many in the 
government would undoubtedly like to clone this fellow. 
41. Justice Holmes is reported to have made a remark to this effect when a law 
clerk came upon him as Holmes was preparing his own federal income tax return and 
the clerk wondered why Holmes was not more disturbed by the task in which he was 
engaged. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS 7 (1963). In a 
letter to Harold J. Laski, dated May 12, 1930, Holmes wrote, "I pay my tax bills more 
readily than any others---for whether the money is well or ill spent I get civilized society 
for it." Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Homes to Harold J. Laski (May 12, 1930), 
in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1247 (Mark OeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). Publicly, Justice 
Holmes communicated his feeling on the relationship between taxes and civilized society 
when dissenting in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal 
Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (I 927) (Holmes, J., dissenting), where he said that "[t]axes 
are what we pay for civilized society." Those words are now engraved in the stone over 
the entrance to the main IRS building in Washington, D.C. MORTIMER LIPSKY, A TAX 
ON WEAL TH 122 ( 1977); see John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity. and Fairness: 
Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. I, 69 n.321 
(1993). Franklin D. Roosevelt later used the statement as a prelude to remarking that 
"[ o ]ne sure way to determine the social conscience of a Government is to examine the 
way taxes are collected and how they are spent. And one sure way to determine the 
social conscience ofan individual is to get his tax-reaction." 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 522, 523 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). 
Justice Holmes publicly made his famous statement regarding taxes and civilization 
in the context of attempting to distinguish taxes from penalties. He distinguished the 
two by pointing out that taxes had a positive side, while penalties had none. Thus, he 
noted that "every exaction of money for an act is a discouragement to the extent of the 
payment required, but that which in its immediacy is a discouragement may be part of 
an encouragement when seen in its organic connection with the whole." Compania 
General de Tabacos, 275 U.S. at I 00 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Taxes are different from 
penalties, he said, because taxes have a positive side---they buy civilization in the form 
of the goods and services provided by the government. Penalties, on the other hand, do 
not have as their purpose the affirmative acquisition of goods or services. Penalties, 
according to Justice Holmes, have as their purpose only the prevention of certain 
conduct. While preventing the conduct in question may have positive consequences, the 
purpose of the penalty is to prevent its occurrence, whereas the purpose of the tax is to 
raise revenue to fund government services. Indeed, Holmes noted that the government 
can lawfully tax conduct that it cannot prevent, whereas it would be foolish for the 
government to penalize conduct if the imposition of the penalty would not prevent it, or 
perhaps more accurately, deter it. Id. 
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benefits where traditional tax policy has examined only fiscal burdens.42 
Tax policy analysis need not remain unidimensional. A multidimension-
al analysis should yield a more complete picture of a tax system. 
Looking at tax systems as vehicles for empowerment provides such a 
multidimensional view and will permit analysis of, and answers to, a 
crucial question: Who should get to choose? 
If progressivity is defined broadly, a system that distributes both its 
burdens and its powers progressively is, as a whole, less progressive than 
one that distributes its burdens progressively and its powers regressively, 
or proportionately.43 The progressive/progressive system takes away 
with one hand (through progressive taxation), but gives with the other 
(through progressive distribution of powers), and thus empowers in 
proportion to the taking.44 By contrast, the progressive/regressive 
system takes away progressively (through progressive taxation), but 
empowers in inverse proportion to the taking. By taxing progressively 
and empowering regressively, it confers its powers on those least subject 
to the taking. Of course, a progressive distribution of benefits (such as 
in the overall progressive/progressive system), might be desirable. 
Whether it is depends on the value placed on a progressive system of 
taxation.45 
42. Not surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service has subscribed to Holmes' 
positive view of taxation. Not only is Holmes' aphorism inscribed over the entrance to 
IRS headquarters, the preface to Form l 040 now includes a statement from the 
Commissioner and a chart that explains the allocation of funds received by the federal 
government, presumably in an effort to make taxpayers feel better about paying taxes. 
As I will develop later, however, the positive attributes of taxation are greater than what 
taxation can buy. It is what a tax system itself, through its structure, can give those who 
are subject to it, independent of the purchasing power of the revenue raised, that reflects 
the deeply held values of those who design it. 
43. A discussion of the question whether it is necessary to adopt such a broad 
redefinition of the concept of progressivity to incorporate analysis of the positive aspects 
of tax systems follows infra after the text accompanying note 49. 
44. Note that the analysis of the distribution of powers is subject to all of the same 
debates as the analysis of the distribution of burdens. Thus, decisions about the unit of 
analysis and the period of analysis must be made, just as they need to be made with 
respect to the distribution of the tax burden. For a good analysis of the offsetting effects 
of regressive tax distribution versus progressive benefit distribution, see GEOFFREY 
KOLLMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE RELATIONSHIP 
OF TAXES AND BENEFITS (1992), available in Westlaw, 1993 WL 751855; DON 
FULLERTON & DIANE L. ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX BURDEN? (1993); C. 
Eugene Steuerle & Jon M, Bakija, How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAX 
NOTES 1763 (1994). 
45. The merits of progressivity have long been hotly debated. See Walter J. Blum 
& Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case/or Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 
(1952); CHARLES 0. GALVEN & BORIS BITIKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE 
SHOULD IT BE? (1969); Harold M. Groves, Toward a Social Theory of Progressive 
Taxation, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 27 (1969); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, I TAX L. REV. 
243 ( 1946); Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 
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However uneasy the case for progressive taxation might remain today, 
it is fair to say that the question of progressivity continues to be 
significant in the formulation of contemporary tax policy.46 Given that 
the degree of progressivity that any tax system provides is an important 
attribute of that system, the progressivity of any system ought to be 
ascertained as precisely as possible. Yet, tax legislation over the last 
decade has tended to mask the degree of progressivity in the system. It 
has used the front door to progressivity--the rate structure----less, and the 
back door to progressivity-limitations on, and phaseouts of, deductions 
as adjusted gross income rises-more.47 Whatever the political merit 
of this approach, its effect on the overall progressivity of the tax system 
TAXES 16 (1982); see also ALVIN RABUSHKA & ROBERT E. HALL, THE FLAT TAX (2d 
ed. I 995); Byrne, supra note 11; Pollack, supra note 11; Schoenblum, supra note 29; 
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure.· A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. I 905 (1987). Professor Coven has wryly 
observed that "Because the winner of the debate [over the merits ofprogressivity] cannot 
be objectively determined, and because the debate itself is entertaining, it will most 
likely continue for eternity." Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the Twenty-
First Century: Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 495, 
508 (1993). Professor Coven argues that because the distribution of the ownership of 
corporate stock is progressive, any reduction in the corporate income tax would be anti-
progressive, and, in his view, undesirable. Id. For additional commentary on the 
desirability of a progressive structure, see Kornhauser, supra note 11; Marc Linder, I 
Like Ike: Bringing Back Eisenhower-Era Progressive Taxation, 67 TAX NOTES 833 
(1995). Empirical work confirms the continuing appeal of progressivity as a matter of 
public policy. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, 
and Compliance, 16 LAW & POL'Y 27, 30-31 (1994). Indeed, the current debate over 
the merits of a flat tax underscore the continuing importance of progressivity in the 
formulation of tax policy. See infra note 174. 
46. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 27, at 35-43. Simply because specific 
legislation makes the system more or less progressive, or is passed with more or less 
concern for the resulting distribution of the tax burden, does not diminish the importance 
of progressivity in evaluating a tax system as long as progressivity remains in the 
forefront of debate about the desirable objectives of tax policy. Thus, even those who 
might agree with Professor Graetz that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 "signal[ed] the 
demise ofprogressivity as the guiding principle for fairness in the distribution of federal 
tax burdens," Michael J. Graetz, Retirement Security and Tax Policy: A Reply, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1239, 1243 n.27 (1989), should also agree that, as long as scholars and 
policymakers continue to debate the appropriate level ofprogressivity, progressivity will 
remain an important concept in the formulation of tax policy. See Michael J. Graetz, 
The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617, 626-28 (1988). 
47. Empirical work confirms that the public has failed to understand the degree of 
progressivity that exists in the system. Roberts & Hite, supra note 45, at 44. The rate 
structure and the public's equation ofit with progressivity, obscures the structural factors 
that can serve to make the effective rate structure more, or less, progressive than the 
statutory rate structure. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 67, 68, l5l(d) (West 1995). 
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has not gone unrecognized by scholars and thoughtful policymakers. 
Nevertheless, scholars and policymakers have not recognized the extent 
to which the degree of choice provided by the system affects the overall 
progressivity of the system. The need to present a complete picture of 
progressivity demands that this omission be corrected. 
Adding an analysis of the distribution of the powers conferred by a tax 
system to the standard progressivity analysis, which focuses only on the 
distribution of burdens, can correct that omission. Such an analysis will 
yield a more complete picture of the progressivity of the system and thus 
better inform the debate on the optimum degree of progressivity.48 My 
objective here is not to decide whether any given system ought to be 
more or less progressive.49 My objective is much more modest. I want 
simply to point out that the distribution of power affects the overall 
progressivity of a tax system. 
Of course, it is possible to conceptualize the positive aspects of a tax 
system---i.e., the ways in which it can confer power-as separate and 
distinct from the concept of progressivity, as traditionally defined. 
Unlike the burden imposed by a tax system, most of which can be 
measured by the dollars of tax paid, the benefits conferred by a tax 
system cannot measured in dollars. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of 
numerical representation for the quantum of power bestowed by a tax 
system. Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to think of the 
empowering aspects of a tax system as separate from its progressivity, 
albeit equally important to an evaluation of its total impact. Neverthe-
less, the logical connection between the positive and the negative aspects 
of a tax system suggests that deciding whether to conceptualize 
48. The progressivity of a system is determined by more than its rate structure. 
Indeed, the current federal income tax system achieves progressivity both through the 
rate structure and through expansion of the base as adjusted gross income increases. See 
I.R.C. §§ 67, 68, 15I(d) (West 1995). Ultimately, the progressivity of the system must 
be judged by the distribution of the amount of taxes actually paid. Recent data suggests 
that the distribution of the tax burden remains progressive, so that the amount of taxes 
paid rises more steeply as income rises. Chris R. Edwards, Who Pays Federal Income 
Taxes?, 66 TAX NOTES 105 (1995). Analysis of the distribution of choice would 
complete this picture by suggesting the extent to which the distribution of burdens would 
be more progressive still if the distribution of choice were less progressive. In other 
words, in a system that distributes both benefits and burdens progressively, the 
distribution of the tax burden reflects choices to behave in ways that reduce tax liability 
as well as choices to behave in ways that do not. The existence of the choice is a 
benefit even to those who choose not to change their behavior. The removal of that 
choice would make the distribution of the burden more progressive still. 
49. For an analysis of the important question of whether a progressive tax system, 
rather than substantive legal rules, should be used to accomplish redistribution of wealth, 
see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the legal System is less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
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empowerment as being distinct from or a part of progressivity is less 
important than recognizing the importance of empowerment as a subject 
for tax policy analysis. Deciding whether progressivity should be 
redefined to include consideration of both positive and negative aspects 
or whether empowerment analysis should become a separate tool of tax 
policy is less important than acknowledging the importance of examining 
the ways in which tax systems empower. Either way, the concept of 
progressivity provides the anchor and the model for the analysis. 
The first step toward developing a mechanism for analyzing the 
quantum of power bestowed by a given tax system is to recognize that 
tax systems can empower, and to dissect the ways in which they can do 
so. We must also develop a vocabulary for talking about the powers 
that tax systems can bestow. Only after that initial exploration should 
we try to develop a system for measuring the quantum of power that any 
given tax system can bestow and for determining the way in which that 
power is distributed. I seek here only to take the first step. Although 
the development of a measurement system must await another day, our 
current inability to measure the distribution of the powers should not 
detract from the insights to be gained from acknowledging and analyzing 
those powers. 
IV. BURDEN POWER: CHOICE REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE TAX BURDEN 
A. The Nominal and Economic Burdens of a Tax 
In addition to giving people the power to avoid the imposition of a tax 
by changing their behavior, tax systems can be designed in ways that 
make it possible for the nominal bearer of the tax burden to shift its 
economic burden to someone else. The nominal bearer of a tax bears 
the statutory responsibility for remitting the appropriate amount of 
money to the govemment.5° For example, the nominal bearer of a 
50. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); 
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 256-79 (1980); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN A. OKNER, WHO BEARS 
THE TAX BURDEN? 25-37 (1974); EDGAR K. BROWNING & WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDEN 12-39 (1979); JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 20. 
The nominal burden is sometimes referred to as the statutory burden. 
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motor fuels excise tax is the seller of the fuel. 51 Economists have long 
realized that the nominal bearer of a tax may not suffer any economic 
detriment as a result of the imposition of the tax. In the case of a motor 
fuels excise tax, the seller will not suffer as a result of the imposition of 
the tax if the tax causes the price of motor fuels to rise but does not 
reduce the demand for the fuels. 52 In such a case, the seller can simply 
increase the price of the fuel by the amount of the tax. Although the 
seller would still bear the nominal burden of the tax, she will not bear 
its economic burden because imposition of the tax will not diminish her 
own economic well-being. The economic burden will be borne by the 
consumer. 53 Such an excise tax gives sellers the choice of either 
retaining the economic burden of the tax or passing it on to the 
consumer in the form of increased prices.54 I will refer to that choice 
as the burden power. 
5 l. JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 20. 
52. Id. In reality, unless the supply of and demand for a product are completely 
inelastic, any rise in the price resulting from a producer's attempt to shift the economic 
burden of a tax to consumers will affect the demand for the product and therefore, to the 
extent demand for the product is reduced and the producer sells fewer units, the producer 
will bear some of the economic burden of the tax as well. The degree to which the 
economic burden of a tax will fall on producers or consumers depends on the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand for the product. As described by the Joint Committee: 
The elasticity of demand is the percentage by which the quantity demanded 
falls if the price paid by consumers rises by one percent. The elasticity of 
supply is the percentage by which the quantity of supplies rises if producers' 
net receipts per unit rise by one percent. If the elasticity of demand for a good 
is high relative to its elasticity of supply, more of the incidence of a tax on the 
good falls upon producers. If the elasticity of supply of a good is high relative 
to its elasticity of demand, most of the incidence of a tax on the good falls 
upon consumers. 
Id. at 25; see also PECHMAN & OKNER, supra note 50, at 27-37, 28 n.7. 
53. PECHMAN & OKNER, supra note 50, at 27-37. 
54. A seller who chooses to retain some or all of the economic burden of the tax 
would either not raise the price at all or raise it by something less than the full amount 
of the tax. I consider such a seller to have borne the economic burden of the tax, rather 
than simply bearing the burden of smaller profits, because, assuming equilibrium before 
the imposition of the tax, the seller should have been making a satisfactory level of 
profit before the tax was imposed. Any reduction in her profit after the introduction of 
the tax I would therefore attribute to the burden of the tax. Of course, the degree to 
which such a seller possesses burden power depends on the elasticity of demand for the 
product. Burden power is greatest when demand is inelastic, as it is in that case that the 
nominal bearer has the greatest ability to shift the economic burden of the tax. See 
supra note 52 and infra note 119. Indeed, it is the inelasticity of the labor supply that 
leads economists to conclude that workers bear the economic burden of the employer's 
half of the social security tax. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. For a 
fuller explanation of the operation of burden power, see infra part IV.D. 
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B. Traditional Economic Analysis 
Traditional economic analysis posits that the nominal incidence of a 
tax does not affect its economic incidence.55 Thus, whether a tax 
imposes its nominal burden on producers or consumers does not affect 
its economic incidence; rather, it is the shapes of the supply and demand 
curves for the good taxed that affect its economic incidence. Traditional 
economic analysis reaches that conclusion because the imposition of a 
tax on a particular item affects its equilibrium price in the same way 
regardless of whether the tax is nominally imposed on producers or 
consumers.56 To illustrate, assume that a five-cent tax is nominally 
imposed on the purchasers of a widget.57 That tax will have the effect 
55. See, e.g., STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 29 (2d 
ed. 1991 ); PECHMAN & OKNER, supra note 50, at 33 n.28 (addressing the incidence of 
the employment tax); JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 21-22. See generally OTTO VON 
MERING, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION (1942). See a/so supra note I 0. 
56. See, e.g., LANDSBURG, supra note 55, at 28-29. 
57. This example, and the diagrammatic illustration that follows, as well as the 
explanatory text accompanying it, appears as Exhibit 1-10 in LANDSBURG, supra note 
55, at 28. (Exhibits from PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, Second Edition by Steven 
E. Landsburg, copyright 1992 by the Dryden Press, reproduced by permission of the 
publisher.) 
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Panel A shows the market for lettuce before and after the imposition of a sales 
tax of 5 cents per head. The original demand curve (D) intersects the supply 
curve at E, which is the point of equilibrium before the tax. When the tax is 
instituted, the demand curve moves down vertically a distance 5 cents, to 0 1• 
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of shifting the demand curve for that widget down by a distance of five 
cents.58 That shift will result in a new equilibrium price at a place five 
cents below where it was before the imposition of the tax, but that new 
equilibrium price will not represent the price consumers must pay for the 
widget because the new purchase price must include the five-cent tax 
they must pay. Thus, the price paid by consumers will be at a point five 
cents above the equilibrium point on the demand curve. If, instead, the 
tax were to be imposed on producers, the tax will shift the supply curve 
up by five cents and, again, there would be a new equilibrium point 
because the supply and demand curves would intersect at a point 
different from the point at which they intersected before the introduction 
of the tax. 59 That new equilibrium point would be at a position five 
cents above the point of pre-tax equilibrium, although the actual amount 
received by producers would have remained the same. Regardless of 
whether the supply or demand curve shifts, the post-tax price to 
consumers becomes the pre-tax price plus five cents and the post-tax 
price to producers is the same as the pre-tax price.60 The tax therefore 
has the same effect whether nominally placed on producers or consum-
ers. 61 
The new equilibrium point is F, and the new equilibrium price for lettuce is 
P,. However, demanders must pay more than P, for a head of lettuc€r--they 
must pay P, plus 5 cents tax. Thus, the price to demanders is 5 cents higher 
than P,. To find the corresponding point, begin at F and move up a distance 
5 cents to G. Since F is on the curve D', G must be on the curve D. The 
price to demanders is Pa· 
Id. at 27, 29. 
Panel B illustrates the effect of a 5 cent excise tax: The supply curve shifts 
upward a vertical distance of 5 cents, leading to a new market equilibrium at 
point H. The corresponding price, PH, is what demanders must pay for a head 
of lettuce. But suppliers keep less than PH when a head of lettuce is 
sold--they keep PH minus 5 cents tax. Thus, the price to suppliers is 5 cents 
below Pw To find the corresponding point, begin at H and move down a 
distance of 5 cents to J. Since H is on the curve Si, J must be on the curve S. 
The price to suppliers is Pi. 
To compare the effects of the two taxes, we must compare the points G and 
F in panel A with the points H and J in panel B. In each case there is only 
one point on the curve D and one point on the curve S, and in each case the 
two points are a distance 5 cents apart. There is only one possible location for 
such points, as shown in panel C. It follows that points G and F are identical 
to points H and J. In other words, the sales tax and the excise tax have 
exactly the same effects on both suppliers and demanders. 
Id. at 29. 
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58. See Panel A in the graph supra note 57. 
59. See Panel B in the graph supra note 57. 
60. Compare Panel A with Panel B in the graph supra note 57. 
6 I. See Panel C in the graph supra note 57. 
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From the proposition that the tax will have the same effect regardless 
of whether its nominal burden is placed on producers or consumers it 
follows that the economic burden of a tax will remain the same 
regardless of whether its nominal burden is placed on producers or 
consumers. Since the distribution of the economic burden of a tax 
depends upon the shapes of the supply and demand curves, and those 
curves remain the same regardless of whether the nominal burden of the 
tax is placed on producers or consumers, it follows that the bearer of the 
economic burden of the tax will be the same regardless of who the 
nominal bearer is. Under this analysis, if suppliers bear the economic 
burden of a tax, they will do so regardless of whether the nominal 
burden of the tax is placed on them or on demanders. 
Economists' focus on the two-dimensional world of supply and 
demand curves thus leads to the conclusion, unassailable from within the 
confines of that world, that placement of the nominal burden of the tax 
is irrelevant to the determination of its economic burden. That two-
dimensional world, however helpful in explaining certain relationships, 
is inadequate to the task of describing the behavior of human beings, 
most of whom are not two-dimensional and many of whom make 
decisions on the basis of a multitude of factors. 
C. The Importance of Visibility 
Unlike economists, I believe that the placement of the nominal burden 
of a tax does matter. Placement of the nominal burden matters because 
it affects the visibility of the tax. The visibility of a tax matters because 
it determines the way people will react to it, not only in an economic 
sense but in an emotional and political sense as well.62 An individual 
who cannot differentiate between the effect of a tax and the effect of 
other market forces cannot change her behavior in response to the tax 
and can take no political action with respect to it. The visibility of the 
62. Jerome Hellerstein, a noted teacher, scholar, and practitioner, well understood 
the importance of knowledge to the responsible exercise of the franchise, and he wrote 
an entire book designed to make the tax system accessible to people who were not tax 
professionals. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 41. As he stated in the introduction, "[u]nless 
laymen have before them nontechnical works which give them the key facts, pose the 
critical issues and present the alternatives, they are lost in acting as responsible citizens 
in a democracy." Id. at 5. More recently, Professor Mccaffery has pointed out that the 
invisibility of certain taxes seems to account for their growth, precisely as cognitive 
theory would predict. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1905. 
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tax thus affects the extent to which the political system becomes 
accountable for its actions. 63 
Furthermore, the visibility of a tax can affect the economic response 
to it because humans are emotional beings who do not necessarily 
behave like the prototypical, wealth-maximizing economic paragon.64 
Accepting the economic precept that placement of the nominal burden 
of a tax is irrelevant to fixing its economic burden requires accepting the 
notion that all price changes produce the same effect. If people were 
simplistically motivated, perhaps that would be so, but I do not believe 
that the motivations for human behavior are so easily discernible. 
Consumers who know the reason for a price increase might respond 
differently to a five-cent increase in price that results from the imposi-
tion of a tax than to one that results from a supplier's decision to 
increase employee wages or from the supplier's attempt to increase its 
profit margin. Such knowledge might affect consumers' demand for a 
product, and thus change the post-increase equilibrium point.65 For 
example, consumers might react to a price increase resulting from 
imposition of a tax by curtailing their consumption of a product out of 
a desire to rebel against the exaction, whereas they might react more 
benignly to a price increase occasioned by a producer's desire to appeal 
to a more affluent segment of the market; or vice versa. My point is not 
that knowledge will cause people to react in any particular way, but 
simply that knowledge will color their reaction. A visible tax provides 
that knowledge. As emotional beings for whom a dollar is not always 
just a dollar, people may alter their behavior based on that knowledge. 
Visibility affects the ability to exercise burden power because one who 
knowingly bears the burden of a tax can decide whether to try to shift 
its economic burden. One who is unaware of the tax cannot even try. 
For example, producers who know that they are bearing the economic 
63. Query: If voters knew and believed, as economists apparently do, that they, 
as providers of labor, bear the employer's half of the social security tax (which brings 
their employment tax burden to over 15 percent), would one see increased efforts to 
reform and reduce that tax? See infra note 96. Similarly, if employers knew and 
believed that employees actually bear the full economic burden of the social security and 
other employment taxes (including the half of the social security tax nominally imposed 
on employers), would the Internal Revenue Service have such trouble preventing 
employers from misclassifying workers as independent contractors? See infra note 100. 
64. While economists often refer to maximizing utility, standard economic analysis 
equates utility with material wealth. While the focus on material wealth might reflect 
the relative ease of measuring material wealth and the relative impossibility of measuring 
other types of utility, it nevertheless presents an incomplete explanation and model for 
human behavior. 
65. See supra note 57, for an explanation of the relationship between price changes 
and the equilibrium point. 
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burden of a tax in the form of higher prices will be able to use that 
information as leverage in price negotiations either with suppliers or 
consumers. In the end, a given producer may decide to retain some or 
all of the economic burden of the tax because shifting it would adversely 
affect her relationship with others. Whatever the producer's decision, it 
is the visibility of the tax (i.e., the producer's knowledge ofit) that gives 
her the power to make that choice. 
Of course, merely possessing knowledge will not permit people to 
change their behavior. People must also be in an economic position to 
change.66 In the short term, the empowerment that proceeds from 
visibility benefits only those in strong economic positions.67 If the 
visibility of the burdens imposed by a tax system motivates those in 
weak economic positions to become politically active and to work to 
effect a change in the tax system, then visibility can, in the long run, 
redound to their benefit as well. 
The visibility of a tax is tied to its nominal burden. Anyone other 
than the nominal bearer of the tax will find it difficult to react to the 
imposition of the tax because she will not be able to isolate the tax from 
66. As discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 144-50, irifra, the 
ability to exercise choice is linked to economic position. 
67. The ability of consumers to react to the effect of sales taxes illustrates this 
point. Retail sales taxes are visible. They are added to the price, noted on sales receipts 
and invoices, and even relied upon as a guide to the computation of the appropriate 
amount of tip. To borrow from the vernacular, sales taxes are "in your face." Despite 
their keen awareness of the tax's existence, most taxpayers can do little in the short term 
to avoid them other than refusing to purchase the taxed item. In the long term, however, 
they are not so powerless. The knowledge wrought by the "in your face" visibility of 
the tax can serve as a springboard for political action to change it. It is no accident that, 
of all of the tax increases enacted by former New Jersey Governor Florio, the increase 
in the sales tax was arguably the most unpopular. Nor was the unpopularity of that tax 
increase due simply to its regressivity. One of the factors that made the Florio tax 
increase so unpopular (contributing significantly to his failure to win re-election) was its 
high visibility. On a level of personal anecdote, I was impressed by the number of 
occasions on which sales people, and others waiting in line at stores in New Jersey 
during the time of the increase, remarked on the increase without any apparent 
prompting except the need to collect the tax. Indeed, I think that the sales tax increase 
probably hurt Governor Florio more than the income tax increase because the visibility 
of the sales tax, and the recurring nature of the need to pay it, served as a constant 
reminder of a politically unpopular act. See, e.g., Eugene Kiely, Whitman Wins; 
Becomes State's First Woman Governor, THE RECORD, Nov. 3, 1993, at Al (noting that 
Florio "became the target of rallies across the state that drew thousands of people and 
wads of toilet paper, which came to symbolize the tax revolt after the state sales tax was 
extended to paper products, among other things."). But see McCaffery, supra note 6, 
at 1901-1905. 
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other factors that affect the price of an item. However clear it might be 
to economists that the nominal and economic burdens of a tax differ, the 
concept is not self-evident to non-economists. It is likely that few non-
economists would recognize the difference absent the benefit of 
education on the point. Those who lack such education and who do not 
realize that the economic burden of a tax has been shifted to them 
cannot even begin to consider ways of changing their behavior in 
response to the imposition of the tax. 
I recognize that what I am suggesting runs counter to accepted 
economic doctrine. As explained above, economic doctrine maintains 
that the economic burden of a tax is unaffected by the placement of its 
nominal burden because the economic burden of the tax is determined 
by the relative shapes of the supply and demand curves, which are, in 
tum, determined by the elasticity of supply or demand for the item in 
question.68 Accepting this doctrinal position requires accepting the 
proposition that supply and demand curves accurately reflect all that is 
important about human behavior and that they follow laws that are, like 
the law of gravity, capable of being understood by humans but not 
capable of being altered. It also assumes that people possess complete 
knowledge. I neither accept the proposition nor make the assumption. 
While I might not disagree with economic doctrine in theory, I cannot 
accept it as either an explanation of, or a prescription for, human 
behavior.69 Curves that depict patterns of supply and demand repre-
68. While economists do consider behavioral responses, they do so only in the 
context of considering the effect of price changes on the supply of, and demand for, a 
certain good. As the Joint Committee has explained, 
Economists measure the behavioral responses of consumers and producers by 
calculating the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply. The elasticity 
of demand is the percentage by which the quantity demanded falls if the price 
paid by consumers rises by one percent. The elasticity of supply is the 
percentage by which the quantity supplied rises if producers' net receipts per 
unit rise by one percent. 
JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 25. 
The shape of the supply and demand curves for particular goods will vary depending 
on the elasticity of supply and demand for them. The degree of elasticity depends on 
the relative shapes of the indifference curves of particular goods (or alternatively, on the 
relative cardinal utility of those goods) and the relationships between those shapes ( or 
utilities) and each individual's budget line. For a good explanation of the role of 
indifference curves in the derivation of supply and demand curves and of the alternative 
theory of cardinal utility, see LANDSBURG, supra note 55, at 53-90. Although 
economists acknowledge the existence of choice, they focus on the result of the exercise 
of choice; that is, they assume information ex post. They do not separately value the 
existence of a choice. 
69. The comparison of a head tax versus an income tax in the Landsburg text 
nicely illustrates the difference between the economists' classical treatment of choice and 
the new role which I seek for the concept. Professor Landsburg asks the question 
whether an individual would prefer to pay a head tax rather than an economically 
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equivalent income tax--that is, an income tax that takes from the individual exactly the 
same amount of money as the head tax. He then analyzes the individual's budget 
constraint relative to the individual's indifference curve for leisure and concludes that 
since the head tax places the individual's optimum along a higher indifference curve than 
an income tax, a head tax is superior to an income tax. His analysis is graphically 
depicted as follows: These graphs, and the explanation that follows them appear as 
Exhibit 3-16 in LANDSBURG, supra note 55, at 79. (Exhibits from PRICE THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS, Second Edition by Steven E. Landsburg, copyright I 992 by the Dryden 









Panel A shows your original (untaxed) budget line and your income tax budget 
line. The optimum on the income tax line is at P. Your after-tax income is 
$G. Your before-tax income is equal to what you would earn if you were on 
your original budget line and working L hours, that is, $H. Your tax bill is 
the difference, or $T. 
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sent, at bottom, choices that individuals make. Choices made with 
complete knowledge will often differ from choices made with incomplete 
knowledge. If that is so, then a change in the quantum of knowledge 
provided might change the behavioral response observed. 
Dollars 
12 
Head Income Leisure Hours 
Tax Tax 
PANEL B 
Panel B shows the head tax budget line, which lies a vertical distance ST 
below the original budget line and consequently passes through point P. The 
optimum on the head tax line must be at a point like Q between P and R, and 
it is consequently on a higher indifference curve. The head tax is thus 
preferable to the income tax. 
Id. at 79. 
The foregoing analysis, while seductively precise, completely ignores the importance 
of taxpayer choice as an independent variable, an unsurprising outcome given its initial 
assumption that the head tax and the income tax would deprive the taxpayer of the same 
amount of money. But, the two systems of taxation are not absolutely equivalent 
precisely because of the importance of taxpayer choice. Under an income tax, taxpayers 
can choose whether to work more or consume more leisure and that choice will 
necessarily affect the size of their tax bill. Individuals should prefer a head tax to an 
income tax only if they do not value the ability to exercise that choice. The unpopulari-
ty of head taxes is testimony to the value individuals place on the exercise of choice. 
See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 27, at 29; Peter Smith, Lessons from the British Poll 
Tax Disaster, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 421 (1991); John Turro, The Second Battle of Britain: 
The Poll Tax, 47 TAX NOTES 261 (]990). To compare the two systems without 
analyzing the importance of providing taxpayers with an opportunity to exercise choice 
is misguided. 
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D. Privatizing Taxation 
If knowledge may affect behavior, including behavior in response to 
price changes, as posited, it should follow logically that acquiring 
knowledge can potentially change behavior. If the placement of the 
nominal burden affects the quantum of knowledge about a tax, then 
changing the placement of the nominal burden will change the quantum 
of knowledge available and thus change the behavior attributable to the 
imposition of the tax. In simpler terms, the more people know about a 
tax the more likely it is that they will change their behavior in response 
to it. Those who bear the nominal burden of the tax are in the best 
position to have that information and are thus most likely to be able to 
change their behavior in response to it. Indeed, one of the reasons the 
nominal bearer is often not the economic bearer might be that the 
nominal bearer has the knowledge, and often the power, to effect a shift. 70 
70. Sometimes tax systems give the nominal bearer this power quite explicitly. 
The federal wealth transfer tax system serves as an example of such a system. Although 
dead people can't pay taxes, they can control whose share of their estate will be reduced 
by the payment of death taxes. (Whether testators bear the economic burden of death 
taxes is an open question the answer to which depends on the importance of the bequest 
motive and the extent to which the existence of the federal wealth transfer taxes alter it. 
See JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 10-11, 68.) To allow testators to exercise such 
control, most wills have "tax clauses." These are provisions that direct that the payment 
of death taxes be taken from particular, identifiable, portions of an estate. Thus, a will 
might provide that the federal estate tax shall be taken out of each beneficiaries' share 
proportionately. Alternatively, a will might provide that the federal estate tax shall be 
taken out of the share bequeathed to a specific beneficiary or even out of the residue. 
It is now well settled that if the will is silent, state law applies. Most states provide for 
an equitable apportionment of death taxes, whereby, in the absence of a direction to the 
contrary, death taxes are apportioned ratably. All of the state statutes operate only as 
default provisions, however. A testator may always direct the apportionment by will. 
Thus, testators retain the power to determine whose shares will be reduced by the 
payment of death taxes. 
Perhaps an example will help to illustrate the effect of this analysis. Consider the 
situation of an unmarried testator, D, who has made no lifetime taxable gifts, who has 
one daughter, and who dies owning the following assets and no significant liabilities: 
I. A bank account with $25,000; 
2. A house worth $700,000; 
3. A life insurance policy over which she has retained the incidents of ownership and 
which will pay $1 million to her daughter; 
4. Marketable securities worth $700,000; 
5. Household and personal effects of negligible value. 
Assume also that in addition to her daughter, D has one sister and one companion with 
whom she is romantically involved. D wants her daughter to receive the proceeds of the 
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Awareness of a tax might affect not only the marketplace reaction to 
its imposition but the political reaction as well.71 Someone who does 
not know that she is bearing the economic burden of a tax cannot react 
politically to it. Such a person is, in a very real sense, disempowered 
and disenfranchised. That the study of economics could provide the 
missing knowledge is scant comfort because it is unlikely that enough 
individuals would engage in that study to allow reasoned discussion in 
a public forum. Taxation with representation can be no more than an 
illusion if the represented do not even realize that they are being taxed, 
or cannot appreciate the extent to which they are being taxed. 
life insurance policy and any household and personal effects her daughter chooses. D 
wants her sister to receive the marketable securities. Finally, D wants her companion 
to receive the house, the bank account and any household and personal effects her 
daughter does not select. (My thanks to my friend and colleague, Jane Baron, whose 
story provided the seed for this example. Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and 
Stories, 42 DUKE L. REV. 630 (1992)). 
The federal estate tax bill for such an estate would amount to roughly $643,000. If 
D does not alter her dispositive scheme to account for the need to pay the federal estate 
tax, state and federal law will do it for her by allocating the tax burden as provided by 
the applicable statutes. (In the case of the life insurance policy, the Code does it. See 
I.R.C. § 2206 (West 1995).) Similar provisions provide a right of recovery in the case 
of property subject to the marital deduction, l.R.C. § 2207A (West 1995), and property 
in which the decedent retained an interest, I.R.C. § 2207B (West 1995). Assuming that 
D chooses not to leave the allocation of the tax liability to state and federal law, D will 
then have to decide whose share of her property she will reduce. If D provides that the 
taxes will be paid out of the residue, only her companion's share will be reduced, but 
it will be reduced significantly. Most likely, the house will have to be sold and the 
companion will receive only the bank account and personal effects. If D provides that 
the tax will be paid out of her sister's share, her sister is likely to get nothing, unless the 
marketable securities increase in value significantly between the time of D's death and 
the time of sale. If D provides that the taxes will be paid ratably out of the property, 
all beneficiaries will receive less. 
A testator's ability to direct the source of payment of the federal estate tax has not 
generally been seen as an empowering feature, but merely as a matter of estate 
administration. See, e.g., Carolyn B. Featheringill, Estate Tax Apportionment and 
Nonprobate Assets: Picking the Right Pocket, 21 CuMB. L. REv. I (]990-91). Even 
those who have noted the importance of taking allocation of the tax burden into account 
in estate planning have done so in the context of trying to ensure that the various 
applicable rules are considered so that their operation does not disrupt the testator's 
dispositive scheme. Id. Indeed, these rules have been used to exhort estate planers to 
ensure that the desired beneficiaries bear the burden of the federal estate tax. Id. Yet, 
this scheme is empowering. It gives testators, not the government, the power to decide 
who will bear the economic burden of the tax. 
71. That feelings about taxation, and political action in response to those feelings, 
run high is amply demonstrated by the passage of California's Proposition 13, which has 
had lasting effects in California, as well as elsewhere. See ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL., 
PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS----THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13, at 5-7 (1995). 
Indeed, one of the reasons that property taxes spawn so much controversy is their 
extraordinarily high visibility. Property taxes are the among the most visible of taxes 
because they are not subject to withholding at the source. All taxpaying property owners 
must not only account for their property taxes, but must also write a check. 
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Acceptance of the proposition that the holder of the nominal burden 
can choose whether to shift or retain the economic burden of the tax has 
one additional, and somewhat more disturbing, consequence. It makes 
the holder of the nominal burden, rather than the government, proximate-
ly responsible for the imposition of the tax. It changes who decides who 
will pay the tax. It privatizes the decision. If an employer has a choice 
whether to shift or retain the economic burden of the employer's share 
of employment taxes, then any portion of those taxes that the employee 
bears as a result of the employer's decision to shift proceeds, at least 
proximately, from that decision. As long as holders of the nominal 
burden can choose to shift or to retain that burden, then it is not only 
possible, but probable, that similarly situated people will be taxed 
dissimilarly. Taxation will result, not from the imposition of a law 
equally applicable to all who are similarly situated, but from the exercise 
of many individual choices. The grant of burden power can therefore 
yield a system where unconnected individuals make decisions based on 
their own self-interest and ability to choose, and the possibility of 
uniformity and connectedness disappears. 
E. Paternalism and Tax System Design 
The foregoing dual consequences of the existence of burden pow-
er-the privatization of the decision regarding the identity of the bearer 
of the economic burden of the tax and the invisibility of the tax 
itself--reflect considerable patemalism.72 By hiding not only the 
72. In his classic work on paternalism, Gerald Dworkin defined the term as "the 
interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively 
to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced." 
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107 (Richard A. 
Wasserstrom ed., 1971), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 35, at 230. 
Dworkin specifically regarded the social security system as paternalistic, classifying it 
as a system of laws that requires individuals to purchase retirement annuities, and, by 
imposing the requirement, interferes with liberty of action. Id. at 231. Dworkin referred 
to the type of paternalism represented by the social security system as "pure" 
paternalism, for it restricts the liberty of those whose good the restriction attempts to 
promote. Id. at 232. Dworkin's subsequent broadening of his definition is consistent 
with this view of the social security system. See infra note 73. Dworkin's view of the 
social security system as paternalistic is underscored by the relative lack of avoidance 
power for those who bear the economic burden of that system. Avoidance power is 
consistent with the existence of personal autonomy and is thus antithetical to paternalism. 
For an interesting twist on classic paternalism analysis, see Mccaffery, supra note 6, at 
1934-37. Although I find Professor McCaffery's quasi-paternalism more attractive than 
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burden but also the identity of the person who inflicts it, a system high 
in burden power denies those who ultimately bear the economic burden 
of a tax the dignity of being able to control their destinies. Such a 
system restricts liberty by withholding the information necessary for 
informed judgments and fails to value the personal autonomy of those 
who bear the economic burden of its taxes.73 
That the system's designers might be able to estimate where the 
economic burden will ultimately reside and that they will seriously take 
those estimates into account in designing the system only underscores its 
paternalistic nature. 74 To all of those who have no burden power the 
designers of such a system are saying, in effect: We will ensure that the 
economic burden is distributed in an equitable manner. Therefore, you 
don't have to know that you are actually paying the tax or that someone 
other than the government is actually deciding to make you pay it. Trust 
us, even though we've denied you the information that would allow you 
to determine whether that trust is warranted. Like the song says, "Don't 
worry-Be happy!"75 
Even if the assumption that necessarily underlies such a statement 
were incontrovertible, that is, even if everyone could agree that burden 
tables accurately reflect economic reality,76 such an attitude would be 
paternalistic in the extreme. That it is based on a debatable proposi-
tion--the accuracy of burden tables--makes it even more trouble-
some.77 When the paternalistic attitude is directed toward those who 
traditional paternalism, I aspire to a response that preserves personal autonomy to a 
degree greater than that afforded by quasi-paternalism. 
73. Dworkin accepted Buchanan's definition of paternalism as "interference with 
a person's freedom of action or freedom of information, or the deliberate dissemination 
of misinformation." Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in 
PATERNALISM 105 (Rolf E. Sartorius ed., 1983), reprinted in PmLOSOPHY OF LAW, 
supra note 35, at 240 (quoting Allen Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PmL. & PUB. 
AFF. 372 (1978)). Nevertheless, Dworkin would go further and define paternalism by 
reference to a denial of personal autonomy. Indeed, he believes that "it is because of 
the violation of the autonomy of others that normative questions about the justification 
of paternalism arise." Id. at 241. 
74. For a thorough description of the ways in which distributional analysis is 
conducted and a critical appraisal of its uses and abuses, see DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF TAX POLICY (David F. Bradford ed., 1995) (hereinafter DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS]. 
75. Bobby Mcferrin, Don't Wony, Be Happy, 73 Simple Pleasures (EMI-
Manhattan Records I 988). 
76. At least one influential commentator disagrees quite strongly. See Graetz, 
supra note 21. 
77. The methodology employed by the different groups responsible for producing 
burden tables within the government alone makes reliance on these tables fraught with 
danger. As the papers presented at the December 1993 Invitational Conference on 
Distributional Analysis for Making Tax Policy sponsored by the American Enterprise 
Institute and published in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TAX POLICY, supra note 74, 
demonstrate, there is no one generally accepted methodology for conducting 
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lack capital, it reflects certain values as well: a high regard for the 
ownership of capital, a disregard for the personal autonomy of those who 
lack capital, and an endorsement of disconnectedness.78 Those values 
are consistent with the values reflected by the grant of avoidance power 
to the holders of capital. For those who value personal autonomy 
independently of the ownership of capital, a tax system that provides a 
high degree of burden power should be judged undesirable for the same 
reason any other paternalistic system would be so judged: it violates the 
personal autonomy of at least some of those at whom it is directed. 
When that same system reserves the grant of avoidance power and the 
attendant opportunity for the exercise of personal autonomy for the 
owners of capital, the picture that emerges is one of a tax system that 
values the ownership of capital above all else. By reserving to the 
owners of capital not only the ability to choose the amount of their 
nominal burden but also the ability to shift the economic burden of the 
tax to someone else, while denying either ability to non-owners of 
capital, the system reflects the value of capital. That value is at odds 
with the values that have traditionally provided the philosophical 
underpinnings for progressive taxation--the value of fairness as 
manifested by the notion that tax liability should rise as ability to pay 
rises. 79 
The effects of invisibility and privatization, and the denial of personal 
autonomy they beget, can be illustrated by considering the likely 
consequences of changing the social security tax system in a way that 
distributional analysis and each of the three government agencies that perfonn 
distributional analysis employs different conventions and methodologies. The Office of 
Tax Analysis at the Department of the Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and 
the Congressional Budget Office each perfonn distributional analysis and produce burden 
tables. Id. at 111, 120, and 128. The extent to which any given burden table can be 
said to represent an accurate picture of the distribution of the tax burden is therefore 
quite problematical. R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Tables and Taxes Policy, in 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 81; Thomas A. Barthold et al., A 
Comparison of Distribution Methodologies, in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
74, at 96. Michael J. Graetz, Distributional Tables Tax Legislation and The 1//usion of 
Precision, in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 15. See also Graetz, supra 
note 21. 
78. In observing that paternalism denies personal autonomy, Gerald Dworkin also 
observed that "[t]he denial of personal autonomy is inconsistent with having others share 
the ends of one's actions---for if they would share the end, it would not be necessary to 
usurp their decision-making powers." Dworkin, supra note 73, at 241. 
79. Professor Mccaffery uses cognitive theory, specifically the phenomenon ofloss 
aversion, to explain this likely reaction. See McCaffery, supra note 6. 
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would place its nominal burden entirely on employees. Traditional 
economic doctrine would maintain that such a change is no change at all 
because the economic burden would remain unchanged in the long run. 
Yet, consider the likely taxpayer reaction to such a proposed change---it 
would almost certainly be adverse and vociferous. Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine that any serious politician would even propose such a change 
because merely proposing it is likely to amount to political suicide. 
Even if economists could agree that the change would have no effect on 
the identity of the bearer of the economic burden of the tax, wage-
earners, enlightened and empowered by the new visibility of the tax, 
would not be indifferent to the change. 
Furthermore, even if such a change were made, the resulting system 
would quite likely be subject to more political scrutiny and controversy. 
Taxpayers would also be more likely to change their behavior in 
response to it, if only by choosing to consume more leisure. Under such 
a revised system, all employees would bear the full amount of the social 
security tax, both in the short term and in the long term. Changes in 
rates would be borne by employees in all industries immediately. Those 
employees who now benefit from their employer's inability to shift the 
economic burden of increased rates immediately upon enactment would 
lose that benefit under a revised system. All employees would, 
therefore, bear the full economic burden that government policy assumes 
them to bear,80 and all employees would be able to identify the 
government as the entity responsible for the net amount of wages 
received. 81 
The federal income tax system receives so much more political and 
taxpayer attention than the social security system for at least two 
reasons. First, the annual obligation to file a return ensures that the 
80. While it is theoretically possible for employers to choose to relieve employees 
of some of the economic burden of a social security tax that is nominally imposed 
entirely on employees, I don't think it is likely that employers would do so in many 
cases. First, shifting the economic burden of a tax away from oneself, as employers do 
under the current system, is different from shifting the economic burden onto oneself. 
Those employers who are in a position to shift the economic burden of the tax onto 
employees are hardly likely to assume the economic burden of any tax nominally 
imposed on employees. In addition, those employers who might choose to retain some 
or all of the economic burden of the tax under the current system might be less likely 
to do so under a system that imposed the nominal burden on employees. 
81. Under the current system it is possible for employees to feel that their 
employer's greediness is responsible for their failure to receive a higher stated wage. 
An employer's failure to pay employees 7.65% more in wages (the prevailing employers' 
share of FICA under I.R.C. § 31 J 1 (West 1995)) is likely ascribed to the employer's 
unwillingness to part with that additional amount, not to the fact that the government is 
taking that amount from the employer on the employee's behalf. 
38 
[VOL. 33: I, 1996] Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
federal income tax system remains highly visible.82 Second, at least in 
the case of the individual income tax, the placement of the nominal and 
economic burdens on the same bearer makes application of the tax 
uniform, and its source----the government's decision to impose the 
tax----clear.83 Further comparison of the federal income and employ-
ment tax systems will illustrate how an analysis of the extent to which 
tax systems empower can affect our views of those systems and the 
values they reflect. 
V. CHOICES AND VALUES IN Two PARALLEL SYSTEMS 
The federal income tax system and the federal employment tax 
system84 are the two most significant federal tax systems.85 Together, 
82. Placement of the obligation to file is relevant to the issue of visibility. There 
is no more direct way of making a tax visible than to require an individual to compute 
the amount due and remit a check therefor. Even a system of withholding at the source 
does not significantly detract from that effect as long as the taxpayer retains annual filing 
and remission obligations. However, when a system of withholding at the source does 
not obligate the taxpayer to perform an annual accounting and does not countenance 
refunds, as is typically the case with employment tax systems, the visibility of that 
system will be impaired. For an exception to the typical no-refund case, see Treas. Reg. 
§ 31.6413(c)-1 (1993) (providing an exception to the "no refund" policy with respect to 
FICA taxes where an individual has had more than one employer during a taxable 
period). The impact of the obligation to file on the visibility of a tax explains, at least 
in part, why it was property taxes that spawned Proposition 13 and why it is the income 
and not the employment tax system that is the source of seemingly perennial debate and 
controversy. 
83. This is certainly true for the portion of the individual income tax imposed on 
labor income, see, e.g., JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 41-43 and sources cited supra 
note 44, just as it is true for an individual income tax on capital when the incidence of 
a tax on capital falls on the owners of capital. For a discussion of the difficulties of 
determining the incidence of a tax on capital imposed at the individual level, see JCT 
PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 44-46. For purposes of this discussion, I have assumed, as 
has the JCT, that the incidence of the individual income tax on capital is on the owners 
of capital. Id. at 45. I have made this assumption because I am persuaded by the 
reasons the JCT stated for assuming likewise. Id. 
84. I use the term "federal employment tax system" to refer only to the federal 
social security tax system created under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 
I.R.C. §§ 310l(a), 311 l(a) (West 1995). The FICA tax is the largest and most broadly 
applicable of the federal employment taxes. Among the taxing provisions that fall 
outside that designation ( which I do not consider for purposes of comparison to the 
income tax system) are the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA), the self-employment 
tax (SECA), and the Railroad Retirement Tax (RRT A). I exclude such provisions for 
varying reasons: In the case of FUTA, the effective tax rate applicable to any particular 
employer varies depending on the employer's experience as regards employee turnover. 
Consequently, the FUT A tax burden, economically borne by employees, is linked to 
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benefits paid out to past and present employees of that particular employer. Thus, 
FUTA operates more like an insurance premium than a tax (unlike the FICA tax which 
has been so far removed from its "social insurance" moorings that it may rightly be 
considered a tax). I.R.C. §§ 3301, 3302(a), 3302(b) (West 1995). The SECA tax is, by 
its very terms, a tax borne nominally by those taxpayers engaged in self-employment, 
see I.R.C. §§ l40l(a), l401(b) (West 1995), and since that tax burden is directly 
attributable to the personal endeavors of the taxpayer, it is, like the federal individual 
income tax, difficult to shift economically. This characteristic, combined with the 
placement of its nominal burden on the individual, makes the SECA tax highly visible. 
For those inclined to self-employment, the SECA tax offers no avoidance power, no 
burden power, and little in the way of choice. It is precisely because the SECA tax 
system does not incorporate these features that I exclude it from my present discussion. 
Finally, I exclude the RRTA tax simply because it is a tax of relatively limited 
application. I.R.C. §§ 3201, 3231(a), 323l(b) (West 1995). 
85. I regard the federal employment tax system as a true tax system. While the 
system was undoubtedly conceived as a funding mechanism for social insurance and, to 
a considerable extent, it still exists for that purpose, the use of the funds raised can be 
analyzed separately from the source of the funds, and the mechanism for the exaction 
of the funds is a tax. The Supreme Court analyzed the exaction as a tax and upheld its 
constitutionality as such. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Indeed, the social security system has been widely 
criticized for its failure to operate as an insurance system, and has increasingly been 
analyzed under criteria applicable to an analysis of tax systems. See Graetz, supra note 
28, at 852. While this approach to an analysis of the social security system has not been 
without its critics, see Altman, supra note 38, at 1427, l believe that it has gained 
sufficient currency to be treated as generally accepted. 
Even economists treat the social security tax as a tax when drawing conclusions 
regarding the overall distribution of the tax burden. See, e.g., Richard Musgrave, A 
Reappraisal of Social Security Financing, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 89, 110 
(Felicity Skidmore ed., 1981) (concluding that the social security tax has reduced the 
overall progressivity of the system). Indeed, the important debate regarding whether the 
system is progressive or regressive and whether that question should be answered on the 
basis of the sources of funds alone or should combine an examination of both sources 
and uses, shows the extent to which viewing the system as one that imposes taxes (both 
positive and negative) has become an accepted part of the mainstream debate. See 
MYERS, supra note 38, at 455; see also JOSEPH A. PECHMAN ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY: 
PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM I 78-80 (1968). 
Moreover, there is a growing trend linking the social security and income taxes. One 
manifestation of this trend is the increased taxation of social security receipts. See 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13207, 13215, 
§§ 3121, 86(a), 107 Stat. 312, 467, 475 (1993) (increasing the maximum amount of 
social security benefits subject to the income tax). See generally COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2ND SESS., 1994 GREEN BOOK: OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT 
PROGRAMS 30 (Comm. Print 1994); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING 
ENTITLEMENT SPENDING 31-34 (1994); James A. Fellows & J. Edison Haney II, Taxing 
the Middle Class, 71 TAXES 654 (1993); Jonathan B. Forman, The Income Tax Treatment 
of Social Welfare Benefits, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 785 (1993); Philip J. Harmelink, 
Taxation of Social Security Benefits: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 42 TAX 
NOTES 1363 (1989); Gene Steuerle, Taxing Social Security Recipients, 66 TAX NOTES 
609 (1995). Another is the enactment and persistent expansion of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), a mechanism designed in substantial part to alleviate the effects of 
the social security tax at the lower ends of the income scale. This conflation of the 
income and social security taxes underscores the similarities between the two exactions. 
For a thorough analysis of the EITC, see Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax 
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these tax systems provide over 70% of the total revenue collected by the 
U.S. Treasury.86 The systems also share several features. In addition 
to raising approximately equivalent amounts of revenue, both systems 
are described by the Internal Revenue Code and both are generally 
familiar to working Americans. Yet, one of the systems takes nearly 
2,000 ~ages to describe, while the other doesn't even manage to fill 100 
pages. 7 Every law school offers at least one course on the 2,000 page 
system, while almost no law school offers even a seminar on the 
other.88 Casebooks on one system fill the bookshelves of practically 
every tax professor in the country, while a law school casebook on the 
other has yet to be published. In short, one of the systems receives a 
phenomenal amount of scholarly and professional attention while the 
other gives rise to little controversy and is barely acknowledged.89 Yet, 
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 
(1995). For an excellent analysis of ways to improve the EITC, see George K. Yin et 
al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the 
Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POLICY 225 (1994). In sum, the 
absence of a direct correlation between the source of the funds and the uses to which 
they are put, which simultaneously infuriates the private insurance advocates and pleases 
those who would argue that the system is more progressive than a simple analysis of its 
tax structure would suggest, convinces me that the system imposes a tax and that it is 
appropriate to analyze it as such and to use its design to illustrate a concept germane to 
the design of tax systems generally. See generally SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE 
RHETORIC OF CRISIS (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988). 
86. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, 331 (table of federal receipts, by source, showing figures 
for 1993 (actual) and for 1994 (estimated)); The Federal Government Dollar Fiscal Year 
1996 Estimates, 66 TAX NOTES 918, 919 (1995) (pie chart depicting estimated United 
States Government Fiscal Year 1996 Funding Sources); see also McCaffery, supra note 
6, at 1876-82; Martin A. Sullivan, Social Security Taxes: No Room to Grow? 71 TAX 
NOTES 113 (1996). 
87. As published by Commerce Clearinghouse, two volume set, I 995. INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE (CCH 1995). This conclusion is based on a rough count of the pages 
in the two volume CCH set, which includes a restatement of prior versions of the 
provisions in very small print, and is subject to great understatement because of CCH's 
practice of having multiple pages that share a number (thus, there might be a page 6411-
1, 6411-2, 6411-3 etc.) It is based on the rough number of pages occupied by Subtitle 
A of Title 26 minus the pages allocated to section 1402, the self-employment tax, and 
the number of pages allocated to Subtitle C of Title 26. 
88. Indeed, most law schools offer at least 3 courses on the 2,000 page system but 
none on the other, and a number of law schools even offer graduate degrees in that 
system, while continuing to ignore the other. 
89. This statement is, I believe, accurate as it pertains to legal scholarship, but is 
somewhat less accurate as it pertains to scholarship in the field of economics. With 
respect to legal scholarship, Jonathan Forman's recent work on the social security system 
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importance to the fisc cannot account for the disparity in attention paid 
by legislatures and the legal profession since both systems raise 
approximately the same amount of revenue.90 Neither can the disparity 
be attributed to the extent to which they create burdens, at least insofar 
as the amount of burden is measured by the revenue generated. 
Something else must account for the difference. I believe that something 
else is the degree of choice, the quantum of avoidance and burden 
powers, that the systems provide.91 Comparing the two systems 
illustrates quite powerfully the benefits of broadening tax policy analysis 
to include the degrees of choice provided by particular systems of 
taxation. 
Illuminating the existence of choice and the identity of its recipients 
in the federal income tax system in comparison to the employment tax 
system provides a stark and revealing contrast. Under the income tax 
system, the wealthier an individual is, the greater the choices she has. 
Not only do those with less wealth have fewer choices under that 
system, they also have a greater proportion of their wealth subject to tax 
under another system, one that provides virtually no opportunity for the 
exercise of choice-the employment tax (social security) system.92 
is a notable exception. Forman, supra note 85. So too is that of Michael Graetz, Nancy 
Altman, and W. Cohen. See WILBUR J. COHEN, RETIREMENT POLICIES UNDER SOCIAL 
SECURITY (I 957); Graetz, supra note 28; Altman, supra note 38; Graetz, supra note 46. 
While the foregoing scholarship is excellent, its volume cannot even begin to 
approximate the volume of excellent scholarship devoted to the income tax, by scholars 
of such stature as Professor Graetz himself. For an excellent compendium of the 
economics literature on the social security tax system, see Graetz, supra note 28; 
Altman, supra note 38; Graetz, supra note 46. 
90. See supra note 86. Professor Mccaffery puts the figure at 85%. Mccaffery, 
supra note 6, at 1877. 
91. I do not believe that the difference is attributable to the ostensible design of 
one as a tax and the other as a program of social insurance because I do not regard the 
employment tax system as a system of social insurance. See supra note 85. 
92. Chris Edwards has shown that "most lower- and middle-income Americans 
now pay more social insurance taxes than they pay in federal income taxes." Chris R. 
Edwards, Typical American Family Pays 40 Percent of Income in Taxes, 66 TAX NOTES 
735 ( 1995). In 1993, the median income family ( defined according to the Bureau of 
Census as two employed, married adults), had total income of$51,204 and paid $7,834 
in federal social insurance taxes compared to $5,341 in federal income taxes. Id. at 736. 
For I 994, Edwards' study estimates that the median income family will have total 
income of $53,354 and will pay $8,163 in social insurance taxes and $5,581 in federal 
income taxes. Id. Edwards' data is based on the assumption that both shares of the 
federal social security tax are economically borne by employees, as most economists 
believe them to be. See infra note 96. 
A review of the data published by the Internal Revenue Service in its Summer 1995, 
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN tends to support Edwards' conclusions. INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETlN (1995) [hereinafter SOI). Thus, 
in 1990-91, when the social security tax rate on employees was 7.65%, SOI table 2 
showed that individuals filing tax returns that showed adjusted gross income (AG!) 
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The employment tax system is nearly bereft of avoidance power for 
employees. The receipt of compensation for personal services generates 
the liability for the tax. Therefore, the choice reduces to one between 
working and not working (or, as economists like to put it, consuming 
leisure) or perhaps, working illegally.93 Furthermore, because the rate 
structure of the tax is not progressive,94 the existence of the tax does 
between $17,000 and $19,000 paid federal income tax at the rate of7.6% (1990) to 7.4% 
(I 99 I) of AGL Id. at 155. Such individuals were therefore remitting as many dollars 
to the federal government in social security tax as they were in federal income tax. 
Individuals with AG! of less than $ I 6,000, whose effective federal tax rate as a 
percentage of AG! was less than 7 .65%, were remitting more dollars to the federal 
government in social security taxes than in federal income taxes. If both halves of the 
social security tax are taken into account, the disparity in remissions is, of course, even 
greater at the lower income levels since the federal income tax payment would stay the 
same. Indeed, the remissions attributable to both halves of the social security tax would 
not even out until taxpayers have over $75,000 of AGL While the SOI comparison is 
somewhat inexact (the tax figures include self-employment tax) they nevertheless provide 
some basis for corroborating Edwards' conclusion and illustrating the relative size of the 
disparity in tax remissions. Professor McCaffery has also provided a powerful and 
detailed illustration of this effect. McCaffery, supra note 6, at n.33. 
93. Even outright evasion of the tax requires that the individual obtain the 
cooperation of her employer, thus depriving the individual of the ability to choose 
unilaterally to alter her behavior so as to remove the obligation to pay the tax. This 
issue received a great deal of publicity when it was revealed that President Clinton's 
nominee for Attorney General, Zoe Baird, had failed to pay employment taxes with 
respect to individuals she had hired to perform domestic services. Stephen Carter, The 
Confirmation Mess, Cleaing Up the Federal Appointments Process,§ 7.25-28 (1994); 
McCaffery, supra note 6. Subsequent nominees for high appointive office underwent 
similar scrutiny, and the ensuing debate led to the enactment of significant changes to 
the threshold filing requirements. The Social Security Domestic Employment Reform 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-387, § 2, 108 Stat. 4071 (creating I.R.C. § 3510); see also 
Scott E. Grimes & Marylyn K. Wiggam, Nanny Tax Act Eases Rules for Employers of 
Domestics, 23 TAX'N LAW 212-16 (1995). Scholarly debate on the effect of the tax on 
the domestic workers' decision to work has become quite heated. See, e.g., Marc 
Linder, What Hath Zoe Baird Wrought? The New FICA Amendments on Domestic 
Service Employees, 66 TAX NOTES I 13 (1995); Jonathan B. Forman, Beyond the Nanny 
Tax: A Cut for All Low-Income Workers, 66 TAX NOTES 741 (1995); Tom Silver, The 
Zoe Baird Debate: A Member of the 'Oppressor' Class Responds, 66 TAX NOTES 893 
(1995); Marc Linder, Marc Linder Responds to Silver and Forman, 66 TAX NOTES 894 
(1995). 
94. Although the social security tax rate structure is not progressive, the 
distribution of social security benefits tends to offset the tax burden. Taken together, the 
social security tax and benefit structure is generally either proportional or mildly 
progressive, although this effect can vary tremendously between individual taxpayers. 
See Graetz, supra note 28, at 872-74; see also Camilla E. Watson, Machiavelli and the 
Politics of Welfare, National Health, and Old Age: A Comparative Perspective of the 
Policies of the United States and Canada, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1337, 1362 n.123. 
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not affect the decision to work at the margin, except perhaps at the point 
where additional wages become free of the tax.95 
The employment tax system also gives little avoidance power to 
employers. If the business requires the performance of services, the 
employment tax will be paid by someone--either an employee or an 
independent contractor. The only question is who will bear the nominal 
burden of the tax. 
By contrast, the employment tax system does create burden power, but 
bestows it almost exclusively on employers. For purposes of formulat-
ing tax policy, economists generally agree that when it comes to ability 
to shift the economic burden of taxes, the owner of the business has it 
all and the hired hand has none.96 Economists reach the conclusion 
that employees bear the economic burden of employment taxes by noting 
that the labor supply is generally inelastic and that employers treat 
95. While generating income above the level subject to the tax would remove the 
obligation to pay the tax on that additional income, individuals who lack the economic 
clout to set their level of compensation effectively do not have that option. Also, the 
existence of the option is really chimerical because the existence of the tax does not 
motivate individuals to generate given levels of income. Unless the level of a tax 
becomes confiscatory, earning more money will always be preferable to earning less, 
particularly if it can be done without forgoing the consumption of leisure. 
96. Many economists acknowledge, however, that the incidence of the employer 
portion of the payroll tax is uncertain. See A. B. Atkinson, The Distribution of the Tax 
Burden, in John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky, Moo. PUB. FIN. 13, 20-36 (1994) 
(citing Richard A. Musgrave et al., The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits, in 
2 PUB. FIN. Q. 259, and JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-85 (1985)). 
Theoretically, it can be shifted forward to consumers or backward to employees. Id. 
( quoting George F. Break, Incidence and Economic Effects of Taxation, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Alan s. Blinder et al. eds., 1974)). Some assert 
that it is borne by employees. See, e.g., Eugene Steuerle & Paul Wilson, The Taxation 
of Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695, 700-01 (1987); Lawrence H. 
Thompson, The Social Security Reform Debate, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1425, 1453 
(1983). Significantly, the government economists in this country uniformly ascribe it 
to employees. Thus, the Joint Committee's burden tables assume that the entire burden 
of the tax on labor (employers' and employees' share) falls upon those supplying the 
labor, because most analyses of the incidence of taxes of labor in the United States so 
assume. JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 41 (citing JOSEPH A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN 
A. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 25-37 (1974)); Pechman, supra; BROWNING 
& JOHNSON, supra note 50; James R. Nunns, OTA 's Methodology for Distributional 
Analysis I (Dec. 16-17, 1993) in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 111; 
Richard A. Kasten & Eric J. Toder, CBO 's Methodology for Distributional Analysis 2 
(Dec. 16-17, 1993) in DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 74, at 120. By contrast, 
government economists in the United Kingdom apparently assume that the burden is 
shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices. Atkinson, supra ( citing 
Michael O'Higgins, The Distributive Effects of Public Expenditure and Taxation: An 
Agnostic View of the CSO Analyses, in TAX'N AND Soc. POL'Y 28 (Cedric T. Sandford 
et al. eds., 1980)). In this country, Browning has argued that the social security tax 
cannot fall exclusively on workers. Edgar K. Browning, Tax Incidence, Indirect Taxes, 
and Transfers, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 525, 532 (I 985). 
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employment taxes as a cost of acqumng labor. By then further 
assuming that employers are willing to spend only a finite amount for 
labor, economists posit that the amount of any employment taxes 
attributable to a particular worker will reduce the amount of cash and 
other compensation that the employer will be willing to provide that 
worker. The inelasticity of the labor supply ensures employers that 
employees won't stop working simply because they are receiving smaller 
wages as a result of the imposition of the tax. Thus, the tax ends up 
burdening the employee.97 
Of course, over the short term, many employers must absorb the costs 
of increases in employment taxes because the market cannot react· 
instantaneously to such changes.98 Nevertheless, over the long term, 
many economists believe that employers shift the costs of employment 
taxes to employees. I believe that employers do so because they choose 
to do so. That shifting the economic burden of the tax is consistent with 
behaving as a rational, profit-maximizing economic actor, does not make 
it less of a choice. Furthermore, employers have that choice and 
employees do not. Employees have no burden power because there is 
no one to whom they can shift the economic burden of employment 
taxes.99 Employers also have some power to shift not only the 
economic burden of employment taxes, but the nominal burden as well, 
by structuring their operations so as to retain independent contractors 
instead of employees. Employers' leeway in this regard is not great and 
97. JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
98. Id. at 43. 
99. In theory, employees have several choices: they can choose to work less and 
consume more leisure, they can work illegally, or they can save so as to accumulate 
capital and then live off the income from capital. The first alternative is not practical 
for people living at the edge of subsistence. For those people, the choice between work 
and leisure is really a choice between working and receiving government transfer 
payments. Since many people abhor the 'dependency' that accompanies reliance on 
government transfer payments, that choice is, practically speaking, a non-choice. Even 
were it not illusory, we would still want to discourage, or even disallow, such a choice 
as a matter of public policy. The second alternative is equally impractical. Many people 
would find the idea of working in an illegal economy as unpalatable as not working at 
all. Thus, even for well-to-do individuals, the ability to choose to work illegally offers 
{practically speaking) no choice at all. And, from a policy standpoint, we should 
certainly discouage the migration of labor from legal to illegal economic activity. 
Finally, the third alternative-living off the income from capital-is, like the first, 
impractical for people living at the edge of subsistence. Such individuals must spend 
everything or nearly everything they make to survive. Even for individuals not on the 
edge of subsistence, this alternative is available only as a long-term strategy. 
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the Internal Revenue Service seems intent on making it ever smaller, 100 
but whatever leeway does exist with respect to the classification of 
workers rests with employers, not with employees. 101 Most of the 
factors that distinguish employees from independent contractors are 
within the province of those who receive the work, not those who 
provide it. 102 Those who receive the work also have the greatest 
l 00. In the early 1970s, the Internal Revenue Service initiated an aggressive 
enforcement campaign targeted at businesses that classified workers as independent 
contractors. John E. North, The Employment Tax Morass, I I CREIGHTON L. REV. 775, 
792-80 I (1978). The Service had apparently come to believe: (I) that self-employed 
workers were less likely to comply with federal tax obligations than were wage earners, 
and (2) that many businesses exacerbated the problem by misclassifying their workers 
as "independent contractors" (i.e., "self-employed") rather than "employees." William 
H. Smith, "Independent Contractor" or "Employee"?-That is the Question, I N.Y.U. 
PROC. OF THE 33rd ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 577, 589-90 (1975). See generally 
Independent Contractor Status: Hearing Before the Comm. on Small Business, House 
of Representatives, I 04th Cong., I st Sess. 58-89 (1995) (Coopers & Lybrand study citing 
IRS and GAO studies that confirm those beliefs) [hereinafter Independent Contractor 
Status]; Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative 
Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 113-20 (1990). For a 
good exposition of the problem and a description of the legislative and taxpayer 
responses, see Myron Hulen et al., Independent Contractors: Compliance and 
Classification Issues, 11 AM. J. TAX POL 13 (1994). The problem has defied a solution 
but legislators continue their search. 
At least three bills targeting the employee/independent contractor controversy were 
introduced during the I 04th Congress alone. See H.R. 1972, I 04th Cong., I st Sess. 
( 1995) (the "Independent Contractor Tax Simplification Act of 1995"); H.R. 510, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (the "Misclassification of Employees Act"), and H.R. 582, 104th 
Cong., l st Sess. (1995) (the "Independent Contractor Tax Fairness Act of 1995"). For 
examples of the current debate, and of IRS efforts to address industry concerns, see IRS 
Overzealous in Enforcement of Independent Contractor Laws, Small-Business 
Representatives Say, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, at 95 TNT 
146 ( summing up industry concerns voiced at July 26th hearing of the House Small 
Business Subcommittee on the classification of independent contractors); IRS Reverses 
Field on Worker Classification, 67 TAX NOTES 1381 (1995) (correspondence between 
Rep. Nancy L. Johnson and IRS Commissioner Margaret M. Richardson); Guy Vander 
Jagt et al., The Significance of the IRS Shift On Worker Classification, 67 TAX NOTES 
1677 (1995); IRS Targets Classification of Workers, TAXES ON PARADE, Aug. JO, 1995, 
at 3 (noting current IRS initiatives designed to harmonize and clarify internal IRS 
procedures relating to worker classification). 
10 l. It is ironic to note that this is also true in Russia, former bastion of the worker, 
and that American practitioner publications are explicitly advising employers to try to 
structure their operations in Russia through the use of independent contractors to avoid 
the need to comply with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation and 
the need to withhold under the Russian individual income tax or make social benefit 
payments on behalf of the individual service provider. See Jean A. Brough & Yuri A. 
Timokhov, Employment Through Independent Contractor and Consulting Agreements, 
5 EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GUIDE 2, 22 (Feb. 1995). Capitalism seems truly to have 
arrived in Russia, warts and all. 
102. See Treas. Reg.§ 31.312\(d)-l (as amended in 1980); Rev. Ru!. 87-41, 1987-1 
C.B. 296; Hulen et al., supra note 100, at 83; Walter H. Nunnallee, Why Congress Needs 
to Fix the Employee/Independent Contractor Tax Rules: Principles, Perceptions, 
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economic incentive to reclassify. By classifying workers as independent 
contractors the recipients of labor also free themselves from the nominal 
burden of employment taxes and, perhaps as significantly, from the 
attendant federal and state reporting requirements. Moreover, market 
imperfections may make it possible for labor recipients to reap the 
economic benefit of avoiding the payment of employment taxes. If 
workers do not realize that they bear the economic burden of employ-
ment taxes, they may judge the adequacy of their remuneration under an 
independent contract without taking into account the increase in nominal 
employment tax liability that will befall them as independent contractors. 
Any difference between what a labor recipient would pay on account of 
an employee and what it actually pays an independent contractor would 
inure to the benefit of the labor recipient and the detriment of the labor 
provider. 103 
Problems, and Proposals, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 93 (I 992). 
103. For example, a labor recipient R who is willing to pay $100 for services, 
inclusive of employment taxes, would offer a wage of $92.89 (arrived at by solving the 
equation: w + 7.65%w = $100, where w is the nominal wage). If R can retain the 
services of an independent contractor for that same amount, R is ahead because she can 
pocket the entire $7.11 that would otherwise have been remitted to the government 
(except that portion offset by the section 162 deduction) and the independent contractor 
is left holding the bag for the full employment tax liability. Even if the independent 
contractor were to demand more than $92.89, as long as that demand was less than $100, 
R would come out ahead. The independent contractor, on the other hand, should seek 
to secure remuneration sufficient to allow him to pay one-half of his self-employment 
tax and still be left with at least $92.89, the nominal amount he could expect to be paid 
by R in an employment context (such amount being subject, in the latter case, to 
withholding of his one-half share of employment taxes). Thus, the independent 
contractor's remuneration x would need to satisfy the relationship: x - ½(s) 2 $92.89, 
wheres represents his SECA tax liability. Now, ½(s) = 7.65%(x - 7.65%[x]). Thus, his 
remuneration, x, would need to satisfy the relationship: x - 7.65%x + 7.65%(7.65%)x 
2 $92.89 or, equivalently, x(l - 7.65% + 7.65%[7.65%]) 2 $92.89, or x(.9294) 2 
$92.89, or x 2 $92.89 + (.9294), or x 2 $99.95. If the independent contractor accepts 
anything less than $99.95, then, all other things being equal, he will be less well off than 
had he agreed to work as an employee for the $92.89 wage. These computations are 
based on the current self-employment tax rate of 12.40% for OASDI and 2.90% for 
hospital insurance, hence, a total of 15.3% in SECA taxes. I.R.C. §§ 140l(a), (b) (West 
1995). Employers and employees each pay 6.2% for OASDI. I.R.C. §§ 310\(a), 
311 l(a) (West 1995). They also pay 1.45% for hospital insurance. I.R.C. §§ 310\(b), 
311 l(b) (West 1995). The total burden for each is 7.65% (or 15.3% collectively) in 
FICA taxes. Note that bearing the nominal burden of the self-employment tax does not, 
as a rough matter, disadvantage a self-employed individual vis a vis an employee 
because I.R.C. §§ 164(f) and 1402(a)(l2) allow the self-employed individual to make use 
of deductions that offer tax advantages comparable to those enjoyed by employees. 
I.R.C. §§ 164(f), 1402(a)(l2) (West 1995). For further discussion of this and other 
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Classifying a worker as an independent contractor rather than as an 
employee means that the labor recipient will have to pay no employment 
taxes (either FICA or FUTA) with respect to the performance of the 
work, while the labor provider will bear the full responsibility for the 
self-employment tax. 104 For tax purposes, the labor recipient has 
everything to gain by structuring the performance of such labor so that 
it can be performed by an independent contractor rather than an 
employee. 105 The labor recipient, that is, the owner of capital, can 
therefore either shift the nominal burden of the tax or refrain from 
incurring it at all depending on how she structures the receipt of 
services. Of course, not all labor recipients can structure the manner in 
which the labor is provided so that the provider qualifies as an 
independent contractor. But the point is that if anybody has the power 
to avoid incurring a nominal or economic tax liability under the 
employment tax system, that person is the owner of capital, not the 
provider of labor. Whatever avoidance power the system does provide 
goes to the owners of capital, not the providers of labor. 
Notably, the labor recipient who succeeds in retaining independent 
contractors rather than employees succeeds in transferring the entire 
nominal burden of the employment tax to the individual labor provid-
er.106 Labor providers who are classified as independent contractors 
end up paying a highly visible tax, and doing so at least in part because 
a labor recipient decided to have them pay it. 107 
issues relating to the tax treatment of self-employed individuals, see infra note I 07, and 
sources cited therein. Of course, notwithstanding the clinical analysis entered into above, 
other factors obviously enter into a labor recipient's calculus on whether to retain an 
independent contractor in lieu of hiring an employee. For example, if the labor recipient 
opts to use an independent contractor, she would no longer pay federal and state 
unemployment taxes. The government would thus lose the benefit of that FUT A. But, 
that loss of revenue should not put the government at a significant disadvantage since 
it does not assume unemployment liability with respect to the independent contractor as 
it would have for the same individual working as an employee. 
104. J.R.C. § 1401 (West 1995); see also supra note 103. 
l 05. See Nunnallee, supra note l 02, at 95-96; see also supra note 103. 
106. I.R.C. § 1401 (West 1995); see ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY 85-89 (l 977); John L. Brown, A Comparison of Four Models of Taxation in 
Their Treatment of Social Security Contributions and Retirement Benefits, 15 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 991, 994, l004 (]989); Graetz, supra note 28, at 867; cf Derek C. 
Bok, Emerging Issues in Social Legislation: Social Security, 80 HARV. L. REV. 717, 729 
(1967) (noting that economists disagree on the extent to which employers' contributions 
are shifted backward to employees as opposed to being shifted forward to consumers in 
the form of higher prices). 
107. The self-employment tax is paid with the federal income tax, on Form 1040 
(Schedule SE), and is subject to the requirement that quarterly estimated tax payments 
be made. I.R.C. § 6654(c)-(d) (West I 995). The Internal Revenue Code contains 
provisions designed to provide self-employed persons with tax treatment roughly equal 
to that provided to employees. For example, employees receive the benefit of reduced 
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Looking at the employment tax system through the lens of empower-
ment thus reveals that whatever quantum of avoidance or burden powers 
it provides goes to employers. 108 In addition, the system is low in 
cost health insurance by virtue of the deductibility of health insurance plans by 
employers (the employees bear only the economic burden of the employer's net cost for 
that insurance). The Code attempts to provide self-employed persons with comparable 
treatment by allowing them to deduct 30% of their personal health insurance costs from 
self-employment gross earnings for income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 162(1) (West 1995). 
Employees also receive the benefit of an "exclusion" from income of that portion of 
employment taxes (7.65% of wage income under current law) attributable to employees 
but nominally borne by employers. That "exclusion" reduces the base upon which both 
income, and FICA, taxes are based. 
The Code provides analogues for self-employed persons. Section 164(1) gives self-
employed persons an income tax deduction equal to one-half of self-employment taxes 
(such amount being 7.65% undercurrent law). I.R.C. §§ 164(1), 1401(a), 140l(b) (West 
1995). Section !402(a)(l2) provides a similar deduction for purposes of computing 
SECA tax liability. Whether these allowances actually serve to place self-employed 
persons on an equal tax footing with employees is dependent on several variables, 
including the respective marginal tax rates of employer and employee. On the whole, 
however, most tax analysts agree that, notwithstanding these allowances, self-employed 
persons are less favorably treated than are wage earners. See, e.g., Alan D. Campbell, 
Making the Self-Employment Tax More Equitable, 68 TAX NOTES 625 (1995); Philip J. 
Harmelink & Janet F. Speyrer, Social Security Tax Changes for the Self-Employed: 
Equity Concerns, 46 TAX NOTES 1063 (1990); Robert J. Myers, An Analysis of the 
Historical Changes in the Basis for Social Security Taxes of Self-Employment Income, 
65 TAXES 299, 300 ( 1987); Gene Steuerle, Does the Social Security Tax Discriminate 
Against the Self-Employed?, 63 TAX NOTES 1205 (1994). 
I 08. As an example of the way in which separating the nominal from the economic 
burden of the tax empowers the recipient of the nominal burden, consider how much 
more difficult it would be for employers to shift the economic burden of the social 
security tax if that tax were raised through a different system. If those funds were raised 
by levying a tax on the transfer of business assets, or stock in business corporations, for 
example, employers would find it more difficult to shift the economic burden of the tax 
to employees. The added difficulty would be a result of the more episodic nature of the 
tax as well as the decreased linkage between the hiring of employees and an increase in 
the amount of tax nominally due. While the added difficulty would not prevent 
employers from shifting the burden to labor, it would probably make the shift less 
uniform. Indeed, determining the economic incidence of such a tax would pose the same 
difficulties as determining the incidence of the corporate income tax. See supra note 6. 
One could even argue that an attraction of the current system is that by making the 
linkage direct, it makes reliable identification of the economic bearer of the tax more 
likely, so that at least somebody knows who is paying the taxes. 
My objective here is not to debate the relative merits of a business transfer tax system 
over an employment tax system or to suggest that a more episodic tax not tied to the 
hiring of workers is more desirable than a steady tax that depends directly on the hiring 
of workers as a mechanism for funding a system of social insurance. My objective is 
more fundamental: once we examine the ways in which the design of a tax system can 
confer power and we identify the recipients of that power, we can proceed to debate 
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visibility for employees, who bear most of the economic burden. 
Perhaps this is consistent with the system's function as a funding 
mechanism for compulsory social insurance. Perhaps this represents a 
decision that the full economic burden is appropriately borne by those 
who will receive its benefits. 109 Perhaps it also represents the paternal-
istic judgment that since the program is for labor's own good, its 
administration through a largely invisible system is expedient, or at least 
inoffensive. And perhaps all of that is precisely the way it should be. 
The problem is that whether that is the way it should be will not be 
debated in full unless the degree to which the system empowers, and the 
identity of those whom it empowers, are isolated as variables worthy of 
discussion in their own right. 
VI. EMPOWERMENT AND VALVES 
Discussion of the ways in which a tax system empowers and the 
identity of those whom it empowers must itself include consideration of 
the burdens of empowerment, as well as its benefits. Empowerment is 
not free. Empowerment is costly both individually and systemically. 
A. Individual Costs 
Individually, choice is the sine qua non of empowerment. Yet, the 
possession of choice is not always positive. Indeed, it can sometimes be 
quite burdensome. The relationship between choices and burdens is a 
curious one and depends on how one views the existence of choice. 
Choice, like a coin, has two sides. The good side posits that having 
whether those who have the power ought to have it and whether alternative systems 
could raise revenue without conferring the same degree of power on the same 
individuals. Recognizing that the current system of employment taxation empowers the 
holders of capital but not the providers of labor proceeds from understanding the ways 
that tax systems can empower and serves as a springboard for a debate about who should 
be empowered. It has one additional salutary effect: it brings to the forefront of tax 
policy analysis the discussion of who bears the economic burden of a tax and of why 
they do so. 
109. In a thoughtful analysis of the federal retirement security system, Professor 
Graetz concludes that the system is flawed because (1) its taxing structure is regressive, 
and (2) it does not allow those at the lower ends of the income scale to maintain their 
standard of living after retirement. Graetz, supra note 28. But see Altman, supra note 
38. See also Graetz, Retirement Security and Tax Policy: A Reply, supra note 46. My 
analysis of the employment tax system corroborates Professor Graetz' conclusion, and 
I suspect that applying the choice analysis to the other two components of federal 
retirement policy---the income tax preferences for employer-sponsored pension plans and 
individual retirement savings--would underscore it. Regrettably ( or perhaps, 
fortunately), such an application and discussion are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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choices makes people feel powerful and in control of their lives. 110 
The positive relationship between choice, empowerment, and psychologi-
cal well-being currently dominates much thinking in psychology and 
child development. 111 Choices, we are told, are good. We want them 
for ourselves and should provide them for our children. 112 Choices 
provide personal autonomy, something we value as a culture and nation. 
Nevertheless, the power to choose has a dark side as well. The dark 
side is that the need to make a choice creates the correlative need to 
acquire information about the available choices and raises the possibility 
of experiencing feelings of regret that the wrong choice was made. 113 
The power to choose, in other words, brings with it responsibility for the 
choice made. 114 Empirical work by psychologists suggests that while 
110. See, e.g., JERRY M. BURGER, DESIRE FOR CONTROL: PERSONALITY, SOCIAL 
AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 4-8 (1992); MYLES I. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE H. LACKEY, 
JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN CONTROL: A GENERAL THEORY OF PURPOSEFUL 
BEHAVIOR II (1991); RALF SCHWARZER, SELF-EFFICACY: THOUGHT CONTROL OF 
ACTION ix (1984); Selma Wassennan, Louis E. Raths: Theories of Empowerment, 67 
CHILDHOOD Eouc. 235 (I 991 ); Shelley Martin & Ralph W. Smith, OBRA Legislation 
and Recreational Activities: Enhancing Personal Control in Nursing Homes, 17 
ACTIVITIES, ADOPTION AND AGING I (1993); Michael D. West & Wendy s. Parent, 
Consumer Choice and Empowerment in Supported Employment Services: Issues and 
Strategies, 1 ASS'N PERSONS WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS 47, 48 (1992); Kenneth W. 
Thomas & Betty A. Velthouse, Cognitive Elements of Empowerment: An "Interpretive" 
Model of Intrinsic Task Motivation, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 66, 67 (1990). 
111. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Gibson, Empowerment Theory and Practice with 
Adolescents of Color in the Child Welfare System, 74 FAM. IN Soc'Y 387, 389 ( 1993); 
see supra note 110. 
112. See ADELE FABER, How To TALK So KIDS WILL LISTEN & LISTEN So KIDS 
WILL TALK 154-55 (1982); ADELE FABER & ELAINE MAZLISH, LIBERATED PARENTS 
LIBERA TED CHILDREN I 09-10, 183-84, 190-97 (1974 ). 
113. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy, 
102 ETHICS 221, 223 (1992); see also infra notes 114-16. 
114. While it is possible to distinguish an action that reflects the making of a choice 
from one that reflects a response to a threat, I believe that within the category of 
propositions that can be classified as choices there are positive choices and negative 
choices. Nozick distinguishes between threats, which he views as producing coerced 
offers, and real offers which, in his view, produce free choices. Robert Nozick, 
Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 
1969). Based on Nozick's work, Mark Kelman has noted that "an offer is any 
proposition that the ultimate choosing party would choose to receive, whether he accepts 
it or not, while a threat is any proposition that the choosing party would rather never 
have heard." Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, I 979 WIS. L. REV. 769, 789 (citing 
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD (Sidney Morgenbesser 
et al. eds., 1969)). By this definition, the statement "your money or your life," when 
uttered by a mugger on a deserted street, would be a threat. Yet, the person who is told 
51 
people like having choices about relatively unimportant matters, they do 
not always welcome choices regarding very important, life or death, 
matters. I Is Legal philosophers have also posited that not all choices 
are welcome_II6 Some things we would rather not be responsible for_II 7 
"your money or your life" has been given an option that the person who is killed 
outright does not have. As long as the option is real-----{hat is, as long as the muggee 
really does have the option of turning over her wallet or getting shot-the muggee has 
what I would define as a choice, even though neither of the alternatives from which she 
can choose is desirable. Indeed, when English liveryman, Thomas Hobson, required his 
customers "to take the horse which stood nearest the door," WEBSTER'S T!IlRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1076 (1986), he offered them a choice which they could 
exercise either by hiring the horse or walking away. However unpleasant the latter 
option may have been, the choice was there. In other words, I disagree with Nozick that 
the lack of desirability in the options presented belies the existence of a choice. 
115. The importance of the underlying matter seems intuitively relevant to the 
question of whether a choice is welcome or not. After all, if we measure the 
"importance" of a matter by the severity of the repercussions that flow from the making 
of the choice, then the more important the matter under consideration, the greater the 
potential disparity between post-choice "reality (and] what might have been." JANET 
LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 4 (1993) (citations omitted). 
But the importance that attaches to a particular matter is not universal1y dispositive of 
whether or not a choice is welcome. A matter may be of the highest importance, yet the 
choice respecting that matter be sorely coveted. In fact, some philosophers have argued 
that the existence of choice, from a moral perspective, always creates a resolvable 
conflict. See WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, MORAL DILEMMAS 2 (1988). Thus, for 
those not unduly prone to regret, even the most critical of decisions should be welcome 
insofar as the decisionmaker can decipher "the one right action." Id. Nevertheless, in 
MORAL DILEMMAS, Armstrong posits that there are dilemmas which involve symmetrical 
moral requirements that are irreconcilable. In such cases (he proffers SoPmE'S 
CHOICE-see infra note 11 7-as one example), the decisionmaker cannot decipher "the 
one right action," nor does such a course exist. Whatever choice is made (including, in 
some cases, the decision not to make a choice), the decisionmaker necessarily violates 
a moral requirement because the choice opted for, being morally symmetrical to its 
counterpart, never was morally "correct." Id. at 54-58. From this perspective, the 
"importance" of a matter is, as we intuited, relevant to the determination of whether 
choice is welcome. But, it is not the fact of importance that is dispositive of that 
question. Life and death matters tend to create unwelcome choices, not because they are 
important, but because they pose moral dilemmas. That most moral dilemmas involve 
important matters accounts for the correlation between the latter and the degree of 
"welcomeness" that attaches to the exercise of choice. For additional reading on the 
"moral" component of decisional theory, and on the price of choice generally, see ADAM 
MORTON, DISASTERS AND DILEMMAS (1991), and compare with GUIDO CALABRESI & 
PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 88, 177-91 ( 1978) ( using the societal dilemma of how 
best to allocate donated kidneys among dialysis patients to illustrate how the making of 
choices may involve collective determinations which are so "highly demoralizing and 
destructive of basic social values" that the choices themselves must be consciously 
abandoned). 
116. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 62 (1988). 
In a chapter provocatively entitled, "Is More Choice Better Than Less?" Dworkin argues 
that both psychic and economic costs are associated with making choices. The economic 
costs include the opportunity costs of foregoing the option rejected and the costs of 
acquiring the information necessary to make the choice. The psychic costs include the 
costs of worrying about the choice and the possibility of experiencing regret over the 
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choice made. Dworkin also points out that just because some degree of choice might 
be good, it does not follow that a greater degree of choice would be better. Id. at 80. 
(In the language of economics, choice is an inferior good, not a normal good). Gordon 
Tullock has also recognized that too much choice might be unwelcome. While he 
asserts that individuals generally prefer more choice to less choice, he points out that 
sometimes people will not prefer choice if the range of choices is too large or if the need 
to make a choice constrains them. He posits the example of college professors who 
might prefer not to have the option of teaching both summer sessions because if they 
had the option they might feel financially constrained to exercise it. GoROON TuLLOCK, 
THE LOGIC OF THE LAW I 5 {1987). 
By distinguishing between willing and choosing, Meir Dan-Cohen has also recognized 
that not all choices are desirable. Dan-Cohen, supra note I 13, at 223; see also supra 
note 114, infra note 117. Dan-Cohen maintains that there is a difference between 
choosing, which involves exercising a preference for one thing over others in a set, and 
willing, which involves exercising a preference because something just is. As an 
example of willing, he posits an individual who goes to a restaurant with the intention 
of having lobster and points out that such an individual would not look at the menu for 
the purpose of making a choice but for the purpose of confirming that lobster is on the 
menu. If that individual is then told that the squab is also good, she will now be made 
to choose, and in doing so she is likely to experience all of the negative psychic effects 
that Dworkin has identified. Dan-Cohen, supra note I I 3, at 229. · 
117. For example, the existence of a choice about what one is to have for dinner 
at a restaurant is likely to be seen as a benefit because the pleasure of having something 
one likes outweighs the costs of having to choose: the effort of reading the menu, 
acquiring information about the composition of particular dishes previously untried, and 
the possibility of experiencing possible feelings of disappointment at not being able to 
have more than one thing or at having chosen something that turns out to be Jess 
appealing than what a dinner companion chose. Dan-Cohen, supra note I I 3, at 229. 
(The restaurant menu analogy is based on an example in Meir Dan-Cohen, amplifying 
discussion supra notes 114-16). 
By contrast, the choice that Sophie must make in SOPHIE'S CHOICE, William Styron, 
SOPHIE'S CHOICE (I 979), is not only a choice no one would want because it is a choice 
between two unspeakably horrifying alternatives, but the mere existence of the choice 
creates a torment that would not exist if the same events occurred without the 
opportunity for the exercise of choice at all. The Nazis force Sophie, the principal 
character in the Styron novel, to relinquish one of her two children when she and the 
children, a boy and a girl, arrive in Auschwitz. Sophie must choose between her 
children and she must then attempt to Jive with that choice. Ultimately, what she cannot 
cope with is the choice. 
This extraordinarily poignant and moving story makes an important point about the 
consequences of having a choice: even those who might cope with an appalling tragedy 
may fail to cope with the consequences of having had to make a choice associated with 
it. The book's central theme is indeed such a choice: the cruelty of forcing Sophie to 
choose exceeded the cruelty of separating her from her children, and it is the choice that 
she is eventually unable to Jive with. The unbearable mental anguish did not stem from 
the absence of choice, but from precisely the opposite situation---being required to make 
a choice that required assuming responsibility for its consequences. See supra notes 
I 14-16. For a review of SOPHIE'S CHOICE, see Michael Kerman, The Prophetic Outrage 
of William Styron, WASH. POST, May 18, 1979, at CJ. Styron, who won the 1968 
Pulitzer prize for his 1967 novel, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER, won the 1980 
53 
Given that choice is not always good, is the existence of choice 
regarding the size of one's federal income tax liability good? The 
answer to that question depends on the value placed on personal 
autonomy. 118 If personal autonomy is valued highly, then the answer 
will likely be yes. A system that provides opportunities to choose 
reflects the value that personal autonomy is more important than the 
time, energy, and money that exercising the choice requires. A system 
that gives only some of its members the opportunity to choose reflects 
one of two views: either that those members are more deserving of 
personal autonomy than others, or that, for certain people, the benefits 
of personal autonomy do not exceed the costs (i.e., the time, energy, and 
money expended in exercising choice). Deciding which of these 
competing views it reflects requires explicit discussion of the role of 
choice in the design of tax systems. Thus far, tax policy analysis has 
not embraced that discussion. 
To say that tax policy analysis has ignored the role of choice is not to 
say that it has ignored the existence of taxpayer behavioral response to 
changes in the tax law. On the contrary, tax policy analysis is very 
cognizant of that response. 119 The ongoing debate about the merits of 
American Book Award for SOPHIE 's CHOICE. He has been widely acclaimed as an 
author. 
I 18. Indeed, Gerald Dworkin cites the relationship between choice and personal 
autonomy as endowing the existence of choice with the value that it has. In Dworkin's 
words, "[ w]hat does have intrinsic value is not having choices but being recognized as 
the kind of creature who is capable of making choices. That capacity grounds our idea 
of what it is to be a person and a moral agent equally worthy of respect by all." 
DWORKIN, supra note 116, at 80. Choices, according to Dworkin, have "constitutive" 
value, by which he means: 
a value that resides neither in the causal effects of making choices nor in the 
value of choices for their own sake, but as definitive of a larger complex that 
is itself valued. If one wants to be the kind of person who makes decisions 
and accepts the responsibility for them, or who chooses and develops a life-
plan, then choices are valued not for what they produce nor for what they are 
in themselves, but as constitutive of a certain ideal of a good life. What 
makes a life ours is that it is shaped by our choices, is selected from 
alternatives, and therefore choice is valued as a necessary part of a larger 
complex. 
Id. at 80-8 I. 
119. Economists also recognize the importance of behavioral responses and refer to 
them as elasticities. See JCT PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 25. Thus, 
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Economists measure the behavioral responses of consumers and producers by 
calculating the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply. The elasticity 
of demand is the percentage by which the quantity demanded falls if the price 
paid by consumers rises by one percent. The elasticity of supply is the 
percentage by which the quantity supplied rises if producers' net receipts per 
unit rise by one percent. If the elasticity of demand for a good is high relative 
to its elasticity of supply, most of the incidence ofa tax on the good falls upon 
producers. If the elasticity of supply of a good is high relative to its elasticity 
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a reduction in the rate of tax on long-term capital gains provides but one 
example of the importance of taxpayer behavioral response to the 
formulation of tax policy. 120 Debates regarding the merits of accelerat-
ed depreciation, investment tax credits, and charitable contributions 
provide a few more.121 That taxpayers react to the existence of taxes 
and to changes in the manner in which those taxes are imposed, is 
accepted as a universal truth. Indeed, it is so well accepted that the only 
of demand, most of the incidence of a tax on the good falls upon consumers. 
Id. (Footnotes omitted). 
When translated from economese, this means that if consumers respond to price 
increases by buying less of the good (high elasticity of demand), then producers have 
to absorb the cost of any tax on the good because, ifthey don't, they can't sell the good. 
If consumers don't respond to price increases by buying less of the good ( demand is 
inelastic), then producers can afford to pass the tax on the good onto the consumers, so 
that consumers end up bearing the economic burden of it. In other words, if they can 
get away with it, producers will shift the economic burden of a tax to consumers. 
120. The extent to which a rise or fall in the capital gains tax rate will alter 
taxpayer behavior (and incidentally benefit or harm low- and middle-income taxpayers) 
has been extensively debated. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE 
NEUTRAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS INCOME UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, 
available in Westlaw, 1994 WL 802580; Colloquium on Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 
315 (1993); Walter J. Blum, The Decline and Fall of Capital Gains: 1921-1957, 28 
TAXES 838 (1950), reprinted in Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains 
Arguments, 44 TAX NOTES 1145 (1989); Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the 
Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957), reprinted in Walter J. Blum, A Handy 
Summary of Capital Gains Arguments, 44 TAX NOTES 1145 (1989); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income 
Tax, 70 IND. L.J. I 19, 164-65 (1994); Harold Pepperell, Should Capital Gains Taxes be 
Raised?, 62 TAX NOTES 379 (1994); Janet W. Tillinger & Martha L. Loudder, Evidence 
of Taxpayer Behavioral Responses to Higher Tax Rates, 65 TAX NOTES 361 (1994); 
Deborah M. Weiss, Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair? Stimulating Savings Through 
Differentiated Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 206, 246-51 (1993). 
121. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable 
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Zelinsky, supra note 8 (discussing the 
propriety and economic effects of accelerated depreciation and other tax incentives); 
Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 663 ( I 988-89). For commentary on the investment tax credit in particular, see 
Stephen R. Corrick & Martin A. Sullivan, An Incremental Investment Tax Credit: Can 
It Deliver on its Promise?, 58 TAX NOTES 209 ( I 993); Jane G. Gravelle, What Can 
Private Investment Incentives Accomplish? The Case of the Investment Tax Credit, 46 
NAT'L TAX J. 275 (1993); Richard P. Roling, Investment Tax Credits and the 'Human 
Experience': Why Not Fairness Rather than Pain?, 58 TAX NOTES 789 (1993); Gene 
Steuerle, The Failure of Investment Incentives, 44 TAX NOTES 821 (1989). For an 
analysis of taxpayer behavioral response to the exclusion of imputed rent, and the 
deductibility of property taxes and home mortgage interest payments, see Harvey S. 
Rosen & Kenneth T. Rosen, Federal Taxes and Homeownership: Evidence from Time 
Series, 88 J. POL. ECON. 59 (1980). 
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controversial question that remains is the extent to which taxpayer 
behavioral responses ought to be quantified and taken into account in 
estimating both the distribution of the tax burden and the likely amount 
of revenue a given change will raise or lose. 122 Even there, the debate 
is not about the existence of taxpayer behavioral response. Instead, it is 
about the likely form of that response and economists' ability to quantify 
it.123 
The traditional view of taxpayer behavioral response neglects to 
consider the benefits that accrue to taxpayers simply from the enactment 
of provisions that permit the exercise of choice. One positive aspect of 
choice is that it makes the system visible. Another is that it makes the 
individual who exercises the choice the arbiter of his or her own tax 
liability. The provision of choice, by making the system visible and 
empowering the individual to react to it, reinforces the value of personal 
autonomy. 
Once the existence of a choice is identified, tax policy should 
determine if the choice is available on equal terms to all who are 
affected by the system. Although a focus on choice alone cannot answer 
the question whether the choice should be available to different people 
in different degrees, it can move the debate toward a discussion of 
values and away from a dependence on the seductive effect of tables and 
formulae. One of those values is personal autonomy; another is 
egalitarianism. If, for example, the analysis reveals that the ability to 
choose is reserved for those who hold material wealth, the value of 
ownership of capital is implicated. If that value is high, then increasing 
the benefits of such ownership is a good thing. 124 
An explicit discussion of the role of choice, and the power it confers, 
will ensure that a discussion of values becomes an explicit part of the 
consideration of tax policy. It will ensure that considerations of 
visibility and privatization, and the values they reflect, receive deliberate 
attention from policymakers. A tax system, like any system of laws 
adopted by a society, reflects the values held by that society. Discussion 
of those values should be open and explicit, unobscured by a veil of 
numbers. Failure to engage in that discussion produces a situation in 
122. See supra note 26 for additional discussion of the debate over dynamic scoring. 
123. See supra note 26. 
124. Perhaps some portions of this analysis might change if the income tax system 
treated human capital as it does other capital. That prospect, however, is unlikely. 
Despite a strong theoretical argument for equalizing the treatment of human and non-
human capital, such equalization is, at present, only a pipe dream. For a recent and 
penetrating analysis of the ideal treatment of human capital under the income tax, see 
Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tqx, 80 VA. L REV. 1477 
(1994). 
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which some, but not all, are empowered, and those who are not 
empowered are the victims of invisible taxes imposed by invisible actors, 
sanctioned by a paternalistic government. 
B. Systemic Costs 
On the systemic level, as on the individual level, empowerment is not 
free. On the contrary, empowerment costs the system in at least four 
ways. First, empowerment leads to complexity. If a system is going to 
empower by providing choices, it must provide for the consequences of 
exercising each possible choice. Such a system will necessarily be more 
complicated than one that only sets forth one set of rules. 125 In 
addition, a system that empowers only a subset of its members will be 
complicated because it will need to provide rules for determining who 
falls within the preferred subset. The emerging proliferation of anti-
abuse rules126 as well as the amount of discussion their very existence 
has generated, eloquently testifies to the complexity spawned by the 
need to determine who is entitled to what treatment.127 
125. If the employment tax system did not distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors, but instead imposed a tax on income derived from the provision 
of personal services, for instance, the need to distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors, and the attendant need for the Internal Revenue Service to 
provide standards for making the distinction and policing its application, would 
disappear, as would the need for two sets of compliance and penalty provisions. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3509, 665l(a)(l), 6653(a), 6672 (West 1995) (compliance and penalty 
provisions applicable in the employer/employee context); I.R.C. §§ 7202, 7204, 7215, 
7205 (West I 995) ( compliance and penalty provisions applicable in the independent 
contractor context). Of course, I am not suggesting that there is no justification for the 
distinction; justifications exist, but making the distinction carries a price. 
126. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.881-0, 1.881-3, 1.881-4, 1.7701(1)-1 (1994) (and 
amendments to Treas. Reg.§§ 1.871-1. 1.1441-3, 1.1441-7, and l.6038A-3). The so-
called conduit financing regulations were published in the Federal Register on October 
14, 1994 pursuant to the authority granted in section 7701(1) to publish regulations 
"recharacterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction directly among 
any 2 or more parties where the Secretary determines that such recharacterization is 
appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this title." I.R.C. § 7701(1) 
(West 1995). These regulations can be expected to apply in the international arena to 
§ 956 transactions as well as to foreign sales corporations. See John Turro, Culbertson 
Briefs Florida Bar on International Developments, January 20, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, 95 TNT 13-10. The partnership anti-abuse regulations provide yet another 
example. See infra note 128. 
127. The tide toward complexity may have begun to tum. The Service's proposal 
to adopt a check-the-box classification system for unincorporated entities both suggests 
that and supports the notion that complexity is borne in large part, of the need to 
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Second, unless a system empowers all people equally, it will 
necessarily discriminate. Discrimination usually leads to dissatisfaction 
on the part of those discriminated against, at least to the extent that those 
discriminated against value personal autonomy and empowerment. That 
the distinctions are deliberate and justifiable does not mitigate the 
consequences of making them in the first place. For example, under the 
current federal income tax system, taxpayers who are contemplating 
alternative structures for a transaction motivated by bona fide business 
objectives have a range of choices that taxpayers who are not so 
motivated do not have. Even if discrimination between those two types 
of taxpayers is both deliberate and defensible, taxpayers who are denied 
the opportunity to exercise choice resent the denial and argue vociferous-
ly against it, as the recent debate over the partnership anti-abuse 
regulations has shown. 128 
A system may also discriminate if it is designed to encourage certain 
types of behavior that are only possible for certain segments of the 
population. For example, a system that reduces the rate of tax on certain 
types of savings is often touted as providing an incentive for savings. 
Under such a system, people who do not need to consume all that they 
produce have a choice. They can choose to consume, and face a higher 
tax burden, or save, and face a lower tax burden. But such a system 
does not provide any choice for those who must consume all they make. 
Such a system discriminates in favor of those who produce more than 
they need to consume because it gives them the power to act in ways 
that will reduce their federal income tax liability. But it denies that 
classify. See infra note 136. 
128. The proposed adoption of the partnership anti-abuse regulations led to a lively 
exchange between proponents and opponents. See, e.g., Robert J. Wells et al., 
Subchapter K Antiabuse Reg Sparks Heated Reactions, 63 TAX NOTES 933 ( 1994); Lee 
A. Sheppard, Partnerships, Consolidated Returns, and Cognitive Dissonance, 63 TAX 
NOTES 936 (1994); The Grass Roots Speak on Antiabuse Reg, 63 TAX NOTES 1369 
(1994) (letter to editor from Schuyler M. Moore); Kip Dellinger, Further Reflections on 
Antiabuse Reg, 63 TAX NOTES 1646 (1994); Don't Prejudge ABA Comments on 
Antiabuse Reg, Urges Egerton, 63 TAX NOTES 1645 (1994) (letter to editor from Charles 
H. Egerton); Kip Dellinger, The Internal Revenue Service's Power Grab, 63 TAX NOTES 
1773 ( 1994); Sheldon I. Banoff, Proposed Antiabuse Reg is 'Fatally Flawed', 64 TAX 
NOTES 125 ( 1994 ); Lawrence M. Stone, Proposed Antiabuse Reg will Create Uncertainty 
But Accomplish Little Else, 64 TAX NOTES 127 (1994); Report on the Proposed 
Partnership Antiabuse Rule by the New York State Bar Association Tax Section, 64 TAX 
NOTES 233 (1994); Joseph Bankman, The Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule: 
Appropriate Response to Serious Problem, 64 TAX NOTES 270 (l 994); Daniel I. 
Halperin, The Partnership Antiabuse Reg: A Reasonable Step in the Right Direction, 
64 TAX NOTES 823 (1994); Eliminate the Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule's Tax 
Avoidance Test, 64 TAX NOTES 969 (1994) (letter from Benjamin J. Cohen to the IRS); 
It's Important to Pave the Way for Antiabuse Rules, 64 TAX NOTES 1237 (1994) (letter 
from Peter L. Faber to the IRS). 
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power to those who must consume all that they produce. Such a system 
empowers. However, since the system empowers only some of those to 
whom it applies, those whom it does not empower may resent it, 
especially if the discrimination is visible. For those who value personal 
autonomy, the resentment flows from the absence of power. 
Third, a system that empowers places on those subject to it the burden 
of obtaining the information necessary to permit the exercise of choice. 
Under such a system, not only must a person acquire information 
sufficient to ascertain whether she is a member of the class of people 
who have been given a choice, but, if she is, she must then acquire 
information about the nature of the choice, so that she can make it. The 
need to acquire this information will require individuals to allocate 
resources to the information-gathering process and will thus burden 
them. 129 To the extent that those resources would otherwise have been 
employed elsewhere, their allocation to information-gathering also 
distorts the economy and is therefore inefficient. 
Fourth, a system that provides opportunities to exercise choice and that 
is therefore discriminatory and burdensome is necessarily more 
expensive to administer than one that makes few distinctions and 
provides little opportunity to choose. 130 Not only does a choice-laden 
system require more people to administer it because it has a greater 
number of provisions, spawned by the need to provide for the conse-
quences of various alternatives, but the need to distinguish between those 
entitled to make choices and those not so entitled requires personnel to 
police and enforce those distinctions. A comparison of the federal 
income and employment tax systems again illustrates these points. 
129. See Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, Reducing the Mounting Tax Compliance Burden, 
66 TAX NOTES 427 (1995); Arthur P. Hall, The Cost of Unstable Tax Laws, 65 TAX 
NOTES 759 (1994) (examining a byproduct of taxpayer choice: the constant revision of 
federal tax laws in response to taxpayer abuse of choice); Arthur P. Hall, The High Cost 
of Tax Compliance, 63 TAX NOTES 887 (1994); Joel Slemrod & Nikki Sorum, The 
Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 461 
(1984). 
I 30. While the costs of administration could be seen as a subset of complexity, I 
have chosen to treat it separately because the burden of administration falls exclusively 
on the government and therefore seems qualitatively different from the burden of 
statutory complexity that falls on taxpayers as well as on the government. For a look 
at the administrative burden borne by government, see Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, The 
Enormous Complexity of Being Fair, 66 TAX NOTES 1711 (1995); Arthur P. Hall, 
Growth of Federal Government Tax 'Industry' Parallels Growth of Tax Code, 65 TAX 
NOTES 1133 (1994). 
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The federal income tax system, unlike the employment tax system, 
provides many opportunities for the exercise of choice. Some of those 
opportunities are explicit. The election to expense certain depreciable 
property,131 the election out of installment reporting,132 the election 
to recognize income upon receipt of restricted property, 133 the election 
to treat an acquisition of stock as an acquisition of assets, 134 and the 
many elections with respect to distributions from qualified retirement 
plans135 provide but a few examples. Many more are implicit. 
Taxpayers may structure their business activities in a variety of different 
entities, each with differing tax consequences. 136 They can choose 
whether and when to realize gains and losses. They can also structure 
certain types of transactions so as to qualify for non-recognition 
treatment. This multiplicity of choices is not without significant costs. 
Unquestionably, the profusion of choices available under the federal 
income tax system carries a high price. 
Much of the high price of choice stems from the resulting complexity. 
The federal income tax system is extraordinarily complex. The 
multitude of implicit and explicit choices that the system provides has 
spawned an entire industry composed of very highly educated people 
who spend their time mastering the choices available and who make 
their living advising taxpayers on the consequences and desirability of 
making one choice over another. I am not talking about compliance 
here--that is, about the difficulty of deciphering the requirements of the 
forms upon which the results of the year's activity must be reported. 
Rather, I am talking about planning. I am talking about the legion of 
lawyers, accountants and related secretaries, paraprofessionals, and other 
auxiliary personnel that help taxpayers exercise the powers that the 
system has given them. Most taxpayers would not even know the range 
131. I.R.C. § 179(a) (West 1995). 
I 32. I.R.C. § 453(d) (West I 995). 
133. I.R.C. § 83(b) (West 1995). 
134. I.R.C. § 338 (West 1995). 
I 35. See i.R.C. § 402 (West 1995) (a mind-numbing range of choices for the 
taxation of distributions from qualified plans, the consequences of which depend on the 
taxpayer's choosing to elect to receive a lump-sum distribution or to effect a rollover of 
some of the distribution into an individual retirement account or similar plan). 
136. Recently proposed regulations would allow unincorporated organizations to 
elect whether to be taxed as a partnership or as an organization taxable as a corporation. 
Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-1, PS-43-95, May 9, 1996, reprinted in 96 TNT 93-1 (May 10, 
1996). See also I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B.; I.R.S. News Release IR-25-29 
(Mar. 29, 1995). For commentary on the proposal to issue the regulations, see Daniel 
Shefter, Check the Box Partnership Classification: A Legitimate Exercise in Tax 
Simplification, 67 TAX NOTES 279 (1995). See also Sheryl Stratton, IRS Imposes 
"Check the Box" Partnership Classification Procedures, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 30, 
1995), available in Lexis, 95 TNT 62-3. 
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of available choices without these professionals, and many transactions 
require the services of not only one, but many of these individuals and 
their attendants. The reason so many individuals are required is that the 
system has become so complex that no one individual can possibly 
master the details of all of the alternative consequences that can flow 
from a given decision. 137 The number of if-then decision trees for any 
given transaction can boggle even the most remarkable of minds. 138 
Eliminating choices would inexorably lead to an elimination of the if-
then decision trees that somebody must draft and that somebody else 
must master and explain to a client. Eliminating choices would also 
render moot all of the rules that determine who can choose and that seek 
to prevent the abuse of choice. However, eliminating choices might also 
make the system much less visible, as individuals would not need to 
grapple with its existence in order to avail themselves of the choices it 
provides. 
The existence of choices, the visibility they bring to the system, and 
the opportunity for the exercise of power that choices confer is largely 
responsible for the current complexity of the federal income tax system. 
137. For a delightful and prescient account of the increasing complexity of the 
Code, see Robert Hellawell, A Tax Fable, 26 TAX L. REV. 659 (1971). Writing an 
allegorical account of the development of the tax law as it might look from the vantage 
point of the year 2020, Hellawell fancifully recounts how: 
In 1995 the income tax provisions [of the Code] alone ran 100,000 pages, 
divided into almost 5,000 sections. While the sheer bulk of these provisions 
is impressive, it is the intricate, nearly impenetrable complications of the 
individual sections that were the hallmark of this Code. Practitioners took 
months or years to master the complexities of a single section. As a result 
most sections, a great many subsections, and not a few paragraphs had their 
corps of full-time practitioners, a nationwide organization and one or more 
monthly periodicals. There were still some generalists, however; many of you 
knew them and remember them fondly. Their knowledge of three or even four 
Code sections was remarkable. 
Id. For another similarly witty commentary on the complexity of the tax law, see Walter 
J. Blum & James P. Johnson, 1913-2013: A Hundred Years of Income Taxation, 33 
TAXES 41 (1955). 
138. Learned Hand once complained that: 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, 
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to 
cross-reference, exception upon exception--couched in abstract terms that offer 
no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some 
vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to 
extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate 
expenditure of time. 
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 213 (1952). 
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Talk of simplifying the system is cheap and in some quarters abundant, 
but a simple income tax system continues to elude us. Why? One 
reason, I believe, is the value we place on personal autonomy and the 
opportunity to exercise choice. 139 The price of simplicity is the 
abrogation of choice, and that is a price which we have thus far been 
unwilling to pay. 140 
While some commentators have attributed the complexity of the 
current federal income tax system to the complexity of the present 
economy and the system's need to reflect the reality of complex 
economic transactions,'41 I disagree. Complex economic transactions 
I 39. The average American seems to be fully aware of this. A Wall Street 
Journal/NBC NEWS poll revealed a nearly even split between respondents' desire to 
have a tax system that touted lower rates but allowed for no deductions (translation: 
little opportunity for the exercise of taxpayer choice) over one that provided higher rates 
but retained the deductions most commonly used by individuals, the charitable contribu• 
tion and home mortgage interest deductions (translation: more opportunity for the 
exercise of taxpayer choice). David Wessel, What Should Be Taxed Will Be the Key 
Issue, WALL ST. J., May I, 1995, at Al. 
140. At least some politicians acknowledge this. Robert Packwood, then Chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee, acknowledged the difficulty of producing a tax system 
that applies a flat rate to a broad base devoid of many deductions and therefore devoid 
of much opportunity for the exercise of taxpayer choice, noting the psychic satisfaction 
that taxpayers receive from deductions. Demise of Balanced Budget Amendment Will 
Lead to Tax Code 'Tinkering, 'Packwood Predicts, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 3, 1995), 
available in Lexis, 95 TNT 43-3. 
141. I do not, of course, attribute to all commentators the view that tax system 
complexity flows inexorably from the complexity of our current economic system. 
Many other reasons for the current complexity of the internal revenue code have been 
proffered. Among these are: (I) the desire of drafters to carry out Congressional 
substantive policy directives, (2) Congressional efforts to conform Code provisions to 
our evolving conception of economic income, (3) the desire of Congress to make the tax 
system fair by first, accounting for differences among taxpayers when designing Code 
provisions and, second, by constantly revising those provisions in response to evolving 
tax avoidance techniques, and even ( 4) the perpetuation of complexity by those players 
in the tax arena who benefit from it, namely the IRS (by virtue of enhanced revenue), 
the tax bar (by virtue of more clients and higher billing), and members of Congress (by 
virtue of increased patronage on the part of those taxpayers either fearful of, or seeking, 
changes in the prevailing legislative or judicial slant on existing law). For a closer look 
at these theories and at the issue of tax complexity generally, see DAVID F. BRADFORD, 
UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 
SMU L. REv. 37 (I 993); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267; Charles E. McClure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax 
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV. 25 ( 1989); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, 
Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 
WASH. L. REV. I (1993); Malcolm L. Morris, Determining Deductions Deserves 
Deductibility, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75 (1993); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, 
Reform, and the ll/usions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON !NDEP. L. REV. 319 
(I 994); Lee A. Sheppard, Is the Income Tax System Becoming Compliance Proof?, 41 
TAX NOTES JOJO (1988); Karla W. Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, 36 TAX 
NOTES 93 (1987); Michelle J. White, Why Are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits?, 
47 TAX NOTES 341 (]990); Patricia D. White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, 
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could be subject to a simple tax system if we were willing to deny those 
who engage in them the opportunity to alter their tax liability by 
changing the structure of the transaction. 142 In short, complex eco-
nomic transactions could be subject to a simpler tax if we were willing 
to accept that the tax system does not have to reflect precisely the 
choices available to people in the economy. 143 The more the system 
tries precisely to reflect economic reality and the choices that reality 
provides, the more it needs to differentiate between the treatment of 
various transactions. The more choices the system provides in its 
attempt to mirror the choices provided by the economy, the more 
complex it will necessarily become. 144 
The enactment of a tax system that seeks to reflect economic reality 
is itself a choice and the product of our values. It reflects the value of 
personal autonomy and the triumph of individualism over communalism. 
It also reflects an acceptance of the prevailing economic order. Under 
that order, money (capital) is power and those with money have more 
power than those without. The federal income tax system reflects that 
order by giving those with capital the power to make choices that those 
Rationality and the Structure of the Federal Income Tax System, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2034 
(1990); Edward A. Zelinsky, Another Look at Tax Law Simplicity, 47 TAX NOTES 1225 
( I 990). 
142. The check the box approach to entity classification proposed by the Internal 
Revenue Service provides an illustration of how this can occur. See supra note I 36. 
By uncoupling substantive reality from tax treatment, the system becomes simpler 
because all of the provisions designed to make the tax classification follow the 
substantive classification can be eliminated, and with them, the need to master them, 
administer them, and prevent their opportunistic use. The social security tax system, 
which is imposed on a relationship that is quite economically complex---the employment 
relationship------provides another example of how simple taxes can apply to complex 
transactions. 
143. But see Gann & Strowd, supra note 130 (complexity results from an attempt 
to achieve fairness through precision in the measurement of tax liability). 
144. Senator Russell Long alluded to this relationship between complexity and the 
desire for the accurate reflection of taxpayer's actions when he quipped: "The 
complexity of our [C]ode in the main is not there because of some mischief. Most of 
it is there in the effort to do more perfect justice." Tax Reform Proposals-III: Hearing 
Before The Senate Committee on Finance, 99th Cong., I st Sess. 53 (testimony by 
Senator Russell B. Long). For other explanations of the increasing complexity of the 
federal income tax system, see Pollack, supra note 141; McLure, Jr., supra note 141 at 
25; Richard L.Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and 
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987); Roundtable 
Discussion, The Uncertain Potential of Tax Simplification, 79 CCH STANDARD FEDERAL 
TAX REPORTS No. 46, Pt. 2 (Sept. 23, 1992). 
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without capital simply do not have. For example, those with capital can 
choose whether or not to incur tax liability by choosing to realize gains. 
The choice does not diminish their wealth, except for the payment of 
taxes. By contrast, those without capital (or with mostly human capital) 
cannot make a choice that affects only their tax liability. To avoid the 
tax liability, they have to forgo the material wealth as well. In addition, 
a large percentage of their total tax burden is imposed by a tax system 
that provides little opportunity to exercise choice, is highly invisible, and 
whose burden is proximately imposed by extra-governmental actors. 145 
That the ownership of capital carries with it the power to make 
choices that its absence denies reflects the existing economic order. That 
order discriminates. It makes distinctions that leave some people happy 
with it and others not. By having a tax system that reflects that order, 
we perpetuate and perhaps exacerbate those distinctions and resent-
ments.146 We do not redistribute, we reinforce. 147 
C. Progressivity and Values 
An individual's view of the appropriate distribution of tax burdens 
reflects her values. One who advocates steeply progressive taxation in 
the traditional sense probably values the egalitarian distribution of wealth 
more highly than its retention by those to whom the market distributes 
it. 148 Such a person probably thinks that market forces alone should 
145. See supra part IV.D. 
146. Redistributing income would, of course, create other distinctions and 
resentments, but those would be consistent with the objectives of progressive taxation. 
The problem is not that the system creates distinctions and resentments, but that it 
creates distinctions and resentments in the people for whose benefit it is at least 
apparently designed. 
147. Joseph Pechman's work supports the foregoing analysis. Pechman analyzed 
income and tax data from 1952 to 1986, and concluded: 
The market distribution of income in the United States has become more 
unequal over the past three decades, particularly since 1981. Thus, the share 
of society's product accruing to the top 15 percent of families has increased 
steadily over this period. [Also,] [t]he federal income tax of the United States 
is only mildly progressive and has not moderated income inequality to a 
significant degree. 
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, The Rich, The Poor, and the Taxes They Pay, in TAX REFORM, 
THE RICH AND THE POOR 26-27 (1989). 
148. Professor Marjorie Kornhauser has argued persuasively that progressivity is 
consistent with feminist values because a progressive tax structure connects people by 
causing them to help one another, whether they like it or not. Professor Kornhauser sees 
progressivity as representing a world view that is in sharp contrast to the atomistic, 
individualistic view which is more typical of the way men think. Kornhauser, supra 
note I I. For a similar analysis in the context of contract law, see Jean Braucher, 
Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 697 (1990). 
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not determine the distribution of wealth and values the contribution to 
the common good more highly than the retention of privately generated 
wealth. Conversely, one who advocates proportional (or frankly 
regressive) taxation probably values the retention of wealth in accor-
dance with market distribution more highly than the redistribution of 
some wealth to others in derogation of market forces. Such a person 
would likely value precisely what the market values and would see no 
reason for a distribution of burdens in accordance with anything other 
than market forces. 
The debate over progressive versus proportional taxation, as tradition-
ally framed, thus implicates views regarding the operation of the market 
and the distribution of privately-generated wealth. That values regarding 
wealth should be at the core of the traditional debate over progressivity 
follows logically from the way in which progressivity analysis has 
traditionally been framed. Since the analysis focuses on the burden of 
taxation, it follows that views about the object of that bur-
den--wealth---should be at the core of the analysis. 
Adding a discussion of benefits to the existing discussion of burdens 
would introduce additional values to the progressivity debate. Primary 
among these values would be that of personal autonomy. Conceptually, 
one may examine the value of personal autonomy separately from the 
value of wealth or income. The degree of personal autonomy enjoyed 
under a given tax system need not depend on the amount of wealth held. 
It can depend on the visibility of the system, the number of choices 
provided, and the ability to identify the source of the imposition of the 
tax burden. A tax system that correlates wealth with personal autonomy 
is the product of the value placed upon wealth, not of some unavoidable 
linkage. 
The distribution of the powers conferred by a system of taxation thus 
provides a window into the relationship between wealth and personal 
autonomy and reveals much about the values of those who designed the 
system. In the case of the federal income tax system, such an examina-
tion reveals that, despite the claims to progressivity made by both its 
supporters and its detractors, progressivity in the distribution of burdens 
is offset by such progressivity in the distribution of powers, that the 
system as a whole amounts to a ringing endorsement of the value of 
wealth and the linkage of wealth to personal autonomy. In the case of 
the social security tax system, such an examination reveals the same 
65 
constellation of values, expressed in that context by the dual mechanisms 
of invisibility and privatization. 
It is, of course, generally true that in a capitalist society wealth brings 
power and that one of those powers is the power to choose.149 
Analyzing the role of choice in the federal income tax system reveals 
that the very system that is both touted and reviled as the antithesis of 
the linkage between wealth and power (at least to the extent that it 
appears designed to distribute its burdens progressively, taking more 
from those who have more), actually serves to reinforce that link. 150 
Not only does the extensive provision of choice in the federal income 
tax system reinforce the relationship between wealth and power and 
apparently contradict the redistributive objective of progressive taxation, 
but the existence of choice yields a system in which the identities of the 
specific bearers of the tax burden often remain hidden from common 
149. Many social programs reflect this truism. Consider, for example, federal 
means-tested entitlement programs. The top five such programs (in terms of revenue 
outlays) are Medicaid, Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), the Food Stamp Program, and the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING ENTITLEMENT SPENDING 2 & n.2 
( 1994). Federal government outlays on these programs totaled $147 billion in 1993, but 
only $46 billion was provided directly to recipients in the form of cash assistance. Id. 
at 3 (AFDC, SSI, and EITC being the sources of cash assistance). Medicaid and the 
Food Stamp Program (providing hospital services and food coupons, respectively) 
account for the most in-kind assistance. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND 
MEANS,1994 GREEN BOOK: OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS; BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 373 (Medicaid outlays in 1992 came to $68 billion, $20 billion more than all 
federal cash outlays to the poor combined). By providing assistance primarily in the 
form of in-kind benefits, the federal government deprives recipients of the ability to 
exercise a wide range of choices. Thus, for example, a food stamp recipient cannot 
choose to redeem his coupons for cigarettes (rather than bread) even if he would have 
opted for cigarettes had he been given the choice. While the Food Stamp Program 
clearly provides recipients more opportunity for the exercise of choice than a program 
of direct distribution of food (such as that utilized to aid refugees), it provides 
significantly less opportunity for the exercise of choice than a system of direct cash 
grants. 
150. This observation will come as no surprise to students of the critical legal 
studies movement, which has long maintained as one of its principal tenets that law 
reflects the hierarchies and values that inhere in the social organization in which it 
operates. Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
563, 563 n. I (1983); see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 
28 BUFF. L. REv. 205 (I 979). Professor Unger acknowledges that others have criticized 
this thesis by pointing out that institutions often lack the cohesiveness that such a theory 
ascribes to them. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). 
For a fascinating account of how legal thinking has evolved to allow explicit linkage of 
the concepts of politics and law, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992). 
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view. 151 Taxpayers behave, not as a body in pursuit of the shared 
objectives that are supposed to animate the system (tax policy), but as 
atomistic actors faced with myriad iterations of the prisoner's dilem-
ma.152 The picture that emerges is not one in which the progressivity 
151. See discussion of visibility, supra part JV.C. Invisibility undercuts the value 
of private property because it can allow the government to take more of an individual's 
property than might otherwise occur-if an individual cannot identify that the property 
is being taken, she cannot act to prevent the taking. Individuals at the bottom of the 
income scale are often subject to a greater burden and concomitant reduction in the value 
of their property because they have less choice and their taxes are less visible. See 
supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
I 52. John Rawls has pointed out that a situation in which there are many choices 
is like a generalized prisoner's dilemma in that people acting in isolation and making 
choices that will affect what happens to them, as well as what happens to others, might 
make choices that, while rational on an individual basis, might not be good from the 
point of view of the whole. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 265-74 (1971). As 
Rawls has written, 
The [problem of isolation] arises whenever the outcome of the many 
individuals' decisions made in isolation is worse for everyone than some other 
course of action, even though, taking the conduct of the others as given, each 
person's decision is perfectly rational. This is simply the general case of the 
prisoner's dilemma of which Hobbes' state of nature is the classical example. 
The isolation problem is to identify these situations and to ascertain the 
binding collective undertaking that would be best from the standpoint of all. 
ld. at 269-70. While I am not suggesting that individuals behave in a way that is as 
disconnected or unidimensional as that which Michael Sandel has alleged would be 
required to produce Rawlsian justice, I do nevertheless agree with Rawls' observation 
that when everyone must make choices in isolation, it is impossible for them to act for 
the common good. Cf MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
I 22-32 ( 1982). The irony of the federal income tax system is that the very existence of 
the system represents an attempt to address the isolation problem since the system seeks 
to provide a mechanism for a "collective undertaking" that should redound to the benefit 
of society, and the provision of significant opportunity for the exercise of isolated choice 
undermines that objective. In Nozick's terms, the provision of significant choice means 
that the egalitarian objective of the system "is overturnable by the voluntary actions of 
individual persons over time." NOZICK, supra note I, at 164. 
Professor Roin has used public choice theory to reach a similar conclusion with respect 
to the effectiveness of the Congressional use of tax incentives. Julie Roin, United They 
Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 62 (1988). Professor Roin argues persuasively that taxpayers' inability to work 
together over time operates as a curb on the abuse of the benefits provided by the Code. 
For a robust critique of public choice theory in general and of its use to explain tax 
legislation in particular, see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: 
A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 76-111 (1990). 
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of a system suggests communalism, but one in which the pursuit of 
individual objectives reigns supreme. 153 
A progressive system suggests caring and connectedness. By asking 
for contributions in proportion to ability to pay, a progressive tax system 
treats taxpayers as members of a cooperative in which those who have 
skills that the market values highly contribute more to the common good 
for the benefit of those who have less highly valued skills.154 A 
visible, progressive system that provides little opportunity for the 
exercise of individual choice regarding whether to make a contribution 
ensures that both the fact of the contribution and its amount result from 
a collective, collaborative process. The absence of choice ensures that 
the voluntary actions of individual persons do not overturn the egalitari-
an design of the system. 155 
By contrast, an apparently progressive system that also gives those 
with more ability to pay more ability to choose whether or not to pay 
contains, in the provision of choice, the seeds of destruction of its 
egalitarian objective. Such a system places individual choice above the 
egalitarian objective of redistribution and by doing so plants the seeds 
153. Perhaps it should not be surprising that a system designed principally by males 
reflects what Professor Kornhauser has classified as typically male values. Kornhauser, 
supra note 11; see also supra note 148. Interestingly, recent empirical work supports 
Professor Kornhauser's thesis. See Roberts & Hite, supra note 45, at 36-37. Professor 
Kornhauser's view of the values advanced by the progressive distribution of tax burdens 
echoes Robert Nozick. Nozick attacks the Rawlsian difference principle, whereby those 
who benefit from superior endowments can behave justly by using those endowments 
for the good of others less endowed, a view that supports the notion of the progressive 
distribution of tax burdens. Nozick asserts that adherence to the difference principle 
would lead to an imposition on society as a whole the type of "loving relationships" 
found within families, a result he pronounces inappropriate because the relationships 
within members of the broader society lack the voluntary nature of familial relationships. 
NOZICK, supra note I, at 167-74. Indeed, Nozick disapproves of the redistributional 
implications of the difference principle even within the context of families. Id. at 167. 
Nozick's opposition to redistribution stems at least partly from what he views as the 
denial of even the opportunity to exercise choice by patterned systems of distributive 
justice. Id. Nozick's focus on disconnected, individualistic action is diametrically 
opposed to Rawls'. Whereas Rawls implores the state to solve the isolation problem, 
Nozick decries the state's efforts to establish patterns of redistribution. Ironically, 
Nozick disagrees with Rawls at least in part because he views Rawlsian theory as 
diminishing the role of individual choice, while Sandel disagrees with Rawls because he 
believes the Rawlsian model requires that individuals possess more opportunity for the 
atomistic exercise of choice than he thinks individuals actually have. SANDEL, supra 
note 152, at 122-32. Fortunately, accepting the thesis of this Article does not require a 
resolution of this debate. The thesis of this Article is only that the existence of choice 
is relevant to the degree of progressivity a system has. How much progressivity a 
system should have, and even whether it should have any at all, is the subject of the 
Rawls-Nozick-Sandel debate. 
154. See supra note 148. 
155. See NOZICK, supra note I, at 164. 
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of destruction of the latter. In addition, by making the choice an 
individual matter, such a system makes the decision as to whether or not 
to contribute an individual, not a collective, one. As in the classic 
prisoner's dilemma, the exercise of choice by each person independently 
of the others can result in a situation in which the choosers are worse off 
by acting independently than they would have been if they had acted 
cooperatively. 156 Providing choice in proportion to wealth thus turns 
a seemingly progressive system into one in which the outward appear-
ance of progressivity can be overturned by the voluntary actions of 
individual persons over time and in which the connectedness wrought by 
the objective ofprogressivity is undercut by the disconnected manner in 
which each choice is exercised. 157 Moreover, because bestowing the 
power to choose in proportion to wealth is itself anti-egalitarian, 
possession of the power can overturn the egalitarian objective even if the 
power is not used. A tax system that either removes the opportunity for 
the exercise of taxpayer choice or distributes that opportunity pursuant 
to some criterion other than economic wealth can reflect values in 
addition, or in opposition, to those of the market, thus resembling a 
cooperative rather than a feudal estate. 158 
D. The Value of Choice 
The federal income tax system requires taxpayers to pay the price of 
obtaining the information necessary to learn about that system, to 
exercise the choices it provides, and to maintain a complex administra-
tive structure to enforce it. It thus requires taxpayers to pay the price of 
choice. It is now time to isolate and debate an important question: do 
we value choice highly enough to pay that price? Analysis of the 
employment tax system reveals that the government does not need to 
156. For a good summary of literature on the prisoner's dilemma, see Ronald J. 
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict 
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509,514 n.15 (1994). See generally 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MORTON 0. DAVIS, 
GAME THEORY (1970); LANDSBURG, supra note 55, at 392-99; ROBERT D. LUCE, 
GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957). 
157. See NOZICK, supra note I, at 164. 
158. Mortimer Lipsky analogized the existing economic order to a feudal state. 
LIPSKY, supra note 41, at 89-104. To the extent that the existing economic order 
reserves power for the wealthy, and pits the wealthy against those who are less so, it 
does indeed share some of the characteristics of the feudal state. 
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provide choice to raise revenue. Indeed, analysis of that system also 
shows that the government can raise revenue much more cheaply without 
providing choice. The absence of significant choice in the employment 
tax system is arguably consistent with the objectives of that system. Can 
the same be said about the abundance of choice in the income tax 
system? Perhaps so, perhaps not. 
The answer to the foregoing question depends on the objectives of the 
system. If the objectives of the system are to raise revenue while 
reflecting and perpetuating the existing economic order, reserving the 
ability to exercise personal autonomy to those favored by that order, the 
answer should be yes. If the objectives of the system are to raise 
revenue while allowing the exercise of personal autonomy without regard 
to economic position, fostering connectedness and redistributing wealth, 
the answer should be no. The increase in the power to exercise personal 
autonomy that accompanies an increase in wealth undermines the 
redistributive function of the system by reducing its progressivity. It 
values wealth, not the personal autonomy of each individual. 
Much is at stake in the perpetuation of the current system. Its 
development shows that, at least implicitly, we value both personal 
autonomy and the existing economic order and that we value those 
things more than we value simplicity, efficiency, and the ability of 
everyone to exercise the same degree of personal autonomy. A focus on 
the extent to which particular features of a system allow for the exercise 
of choice, and on the identity of those who will be the beneficiaries of 
that choice, will bring the debate about those values to the forefront. 
E. Choice and Visibility 
A focus on the existence of choice and on the identity of those who 
receive the opportunity to exercise it should also lead to greater 
questioning of the way in which the design of a tax system hides the 
identity of the economic bearer of the tax burden, and to an explicit 
debate of the merits of so hiding it. Policymakers might rationally, if 
patemalistically, decide that a system that hides the economic burden of 
a tax by placing the nominal burden on those with the power to shift it 
is preferable to a system that makes the identity of the bearer of the 
economic burden explicit. Such a decision would result in a system with 
hidden burdens, and would deny those affected by the system the ability 
to decide for themselves where the burden should be and to voice 
differing views regarding that placement. 159 Of course, such a system 
159. See supra part IV.E. 
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might be expeditiously enacted because it would attract little opposition. 
It might also be simple and cheap to administer because it will not be 
concerned with tracking economic reality. 160 The question is whether 
such a system is desirable. 
The segments of the population empowered by the ability to shift the 
economic incidence of taxation are, in very general terms, the same 
segments empowered by receiving the greatest number of choices under 
the individual income tax system. They are the owners of capital. 161 
160. For example, the employment tax system and the federal corporate income tax 
system are simpler and probably cheaper to administer than either the individual income 
tax system or a system that integrated the corporate and individual income taxes. If it 
were stripped of the rules designed to thwart the exercise of taxpayer choice, the 
corporate tax system would not be particularly complex. It is the anti-abuse rules in 
their various guises (not only the regulations under§ 337(d) but the statutory provisions 
of §§ 302(b), 304, 318, 305(b)-(d), 306, and so forth) that make subchapter C 
complicated. Another example of this is in the realm of consumption taxes. Referring 
to European value-added tax provisions, Cliff Massa III, Vice Chair of the ABA Tax 
Section's Committee On Value-Added Tax, described them as "a set of laws about as 
complex as the U.S. income tax as to what is taxed, what isn't, and what is taxed at a 
particular rate. Companies spend a great deal of time trying to get their products into 
one rate or another like U.S. companies argue over the depreciation schedule." Claudia 
Maclachlan, Consumption Taxes, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1995, at Bl. To prevent this, 
European officials recommend eschewing exemptions in favor of refunds or rebates. Id.; 
see also Sijbren Cnossen, Administrative and Compliance Costs of the VAT: A Review 
of the Evidence, 63 TAX NOTES 1609 (1994); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Scoping Out the 
Uncertain Simplification (Complication) Effects ofVAT's, BAT's, and Consumed Income 
Taxes, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 390 (1995); George K. Yin, Accommodating the "Low-Income" 
in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax World, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 445 (1995). 
The problem with simpler and cheaper tax systems is that they primarily empower 
segments of the population who would be less empowered under a system that placed 
its nominal burden upon the recipient of its economic burden. (I treat the concepts of 
power and empowerment as positive, not as power over someone but as "ability or 
capacity, the power to do something." Angela Harris, Foreword: A Jurisprudence of 
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 781 (1994) (citing THOMAS E. WARTENBERG, THE 
FORMS OF POWER: FROM DOMINATION TO TRANSFORMATION 17-19 (1990)). As 
Professor Harris points out, "In post-structuralist theory ... 'power' is not only negative 
or repressive--an infringement on prior liberty-but also productive and creative." 
Harris, supra, at 773.) They also allow individuals, acting in isolation for their own 
benefit only and not in concert in pursuit of the common good, to be the arbiters of the 
final placement of the economic burden of taxation. They are the antithesis of 
connectedness. 
161. Professor Kornhauser has suggested that the design of the income tax system 
reflects not a preference for the ownership of capital, but rather an ambivalence toward 
it. Kornhauser, supra note 120. She reaches that conclusion by tracing the apparently 
cyclical nature of changes in the tax law, and showing how they reveal more or less 
deference toward the ownership of wealth. Her argument is persuasive, and not 
necessarily at odds with the claim I make here, since whether the system shows more 
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Perhaps that is precisely as it should be. Much economic theory is built 
around the value of capital, the need to preserve it, and the desirability 
of enhancing it. But if a tax system is to be designed so as to preserve 
and enhance the value of owning capital, those who design it for that 
purpose ought to be candid about it. Lip service to notions of 
progressivity and ability to pay only serves to confound the issues and 
prevents a frank discussion of the values the system perpetuates. A 
discussion of the ways in which tax systems empower could go a long 
way toward illuminating what is at stake. It could also lead the 
formulators of tax policy to consider the value of empowerment as an 
end in itself, a goal that scholars in other fields have often urged. 162 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In his recent book, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Or-
der-Origins of the Federal Income Tax 1861-1913, Robert Stanley, a 
lawyer and historian, advances an intriguing thesis: The enactment of 
a system of federal income taxation resulted from centrism, which he 
defines as including "an inertial commitment to statist capitalism-to the 
use of law in support of privately held enterprise."163 Stanley posits 
or less deference to wealth at one time or another or in one respect or another, I believe 
it is still the case that even at its low points, it shows more deference to the ownership 
of capital than other possible alternatives. 
I 62. For a thoughtful reflection on the importance of empowerment as an end in 
itself, see Harris, supra note J 60, at 78 I. For an illustration of how empowerment can 
proceed from connectedness, see Barbara Christian, The Race for Theory, in MAKING 
FACE, MAKING SOUL, HACIENDO CARAS: CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY 
WOMEN OF COLOR 335, 343 (Gloria Anzaldaeua ed., 1990). 
]63. ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER---0RIGINS 
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1861-1913, 12 (1993). Stanley's thesis is in sharp 
contrast to the traditional view that sees the nominally progressive income tax as the 
embodiment of the principle of redistribution and thus as a system to be abhorred by 
defenders of the interests of private property. For example, in his excellent recent 
history of the American legal system, Morton Horwitz recounts a speech given by Judge 
John F. Dillon as Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), was 
being heard, and quotes him as noting that while proportional taxation might be 
legitimate, when taxes are levied 
[F)or the real purpose of reaching the accumulated fruits of indus(ry, and are 
not equal and reasonable, but designed as a forced contribution from the rich 
for the benefit of the poor, and as a means of distributing the rich man's 
property among the rest of the community--this is class legislation of the most 
pronounced and vicious type; [it) is, in [a) word, confiscation and not taxation. 
Such schemes of pillage [are) violative of the constitutional rights of the 
property owner, subversive of the existing social polity, and essentially 
revolutionary. 
HORWITZ, supra note 150, at 26 (quoting John F. Dillon, Property-Its Rights and Duties 
in Our Legal and Social Systems, 29 AM. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1895)). Horwitz himself 
seems to view the Court's decision holding the federal income tax unconstitutional in 
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that in enacting the first generally applicable system of income taxation, 
the legislators of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
motivated more by what they shared-wealth, power, and the desire to 
retain them--than by the differences in the rhetoric that separated 
them. 164 Stanley refers to this shared perspective as centrist and uses 
it to 
(E]xplain the apparent contradiction between the reformist promise of income 
taxation and its fitful history by demonstrating that it is the vision of law in 
society held by the dominant tradition which has led to our perception that a 
contradiction exists at all. Proceeding from changed assumptions about the 
nature of society, the state, law, and history, [Stanley's analysis] contends that 
there was no contradiction. (It] reveals that income taxation was not created as 
a vehicle for the authentic expansion of wealth and opportunity through a 
redirection of the continuous flow of legally channeled largesse. Rather, as a 
product of the center's efforts to protect itself against dissent, income taxation 
served as an important element in the maintenance of the traditional order. 165 
It is my thesis that the federal income tax system still serves that 
purpose, and that a more complete analysis of tax system design would 
so reveal. 166 
Pollock as evidence that "the anti-distribution principle had come to be thought of as 
part of the very essence of the constitutional law ofa neutral state." Id. Unlike Stanley, 
however, Horwitz sees that view as changing, and identifies the Court's decision in 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) as the catalyst for change. Horwitz observes 
that the ratification of the 16th Amendment eliminated the "clean distinction between a 
tax and a taking. Not only had the constitutional legitimacy of the progressive income 
tax muddied that distinction but, even more important, it had discredited the Classical 
notion that a neutral state entailed opposition to redistribution." Id. at 165. 
164. In I 977, Mortimer Lipsky made a similar argument with respect to the actual 
effects of the income tax, and charged that "The functioning of the tax law upholds the 
wisdom of the Biblical aphorism that 'from him who has not shall be taken away and 
to him who has shall be given."' LIPSKY, supra note 41, at 139. While Mr. Lipsky may 
have been overstating his case a bit, at least as regards the burdens which served as the 
focus of his analysis, his charge applies with a bit more force to the distribution of 
power under the current system. 
165. STANLEY, supra note 163, at 14. John Witte made a similar claim in 1985, 
when he argued that the ostensibly opposing sides in the tax reform debate were linked 
by what they shared and separated only slightly by their differences. WITTE, supra note 
28, at 20-21, 244-68. Wilie's attack on the incremental nature of changes in the tax law 
and his prediction that the system had undergone about as much incremental change as 
it could endure, though boosted by the rhetoric of the changes effected in 1986, have, 
in the nearly IO years since then, been proven premature. 
166. In so concluding, I part with Stanley, who concludes that the modem income 
tax does not reflect centrism because it now affects everyone, and is no longer reserved 
for a very few taxpayers at the top of the income scale, as was the I 913 tax. See 
WITTE, supra note 28, at 255-56. 
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A complete analysis of a tax system design should consider both how 
the system burdens and how it benefits---how it gives as well as how it 
takes away. Traditional tax policy has only considered burdens. 
Existing data tells us a lot about what various systems of taxation 
remove from people, but, predictably, not much about what such systems 
give them. The data generally supports the view of the income tax as 
progressive and thus redistributive; it shows that a higher percentage of 
revenue comes from the people at the top of the income scale than from 
the people at the bottom. 167 The data thus corroborates the traditional 
view of the income tax as the darling of liberals and progressives. 168 
167. Chris R. Edwards, an economist at the Tax Foundation in Washington, D.C., 
has studied the relationship between the level of income received and the proportion of 
the tax burden borne, and has shown that individuals at the highest income levels 
supplied the greatest proportion of federal tax revenues, and that the proportion of tax 
revenues paid by those at the top of the income distribution rose in the decade between 
1982 and 1992 notwithstanding the reduction in marginal rates during that time. Chris 
R. Edwards, Who Pays Federal Income Taxes?, 66 TAX NOTES 105 (1995). Edwards 
has shown that the effective "federal income tax rate rises steadily with income from 2 
percent for those earning under $10,000 per year to over 27 percent for those earning 
over $ I million per year." Id. Edwards also noted that while the millionaire group 
earned 4.6 percent of the total adjusted gross income, it paid nearly IO percent of the 
total federal income taxes. Id. (see in particular Table 2 at 108.) Edwards' data also 
shows that whereas individuals in income groups below the $50,000 to $100,000 group 
paid a share of the total taxes that was smaller than the share of total adjusted gross 
income they received, and individuals in the $50,000 to $100,000 group itself paid a 
share of the total taxes that was nearly the same as the share of total adjusted gross 
income they received (28.7 percent of AG! versus 29.5 percent of taxes), individuals in 
groups above the $50,000 to $ I 00,000 group paid a much higher share of taxes than the 
share of income they received. Id. This distributional pattern obtained notwithstanding 
that the rates applicable in 1992 were lower than in 1982, a phenomenon that Edwards 
attributes to the increase in the share of adjusted gross income received by high income 
recipients. In other words, the rich are paying more in taxes because they are getting 
richer. While Edwards' study indicates that the system has retained its fundamental 
progressive structure, the data does not permit any conclusions regarding the relative 
degree of progressivity. 
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on May 18, 1995, Michael Graetz 
drew similar conclusions regarding the progressivity of the existing system, based on 
preliminary IRS data for 1993. Michael J. Graetz, Current Flat Tax Proposals, 67 TAX 
NOTES 1256, 1260 (!995). Although he was able to perform only "back of the envelope 
calculations," he concluded that in 1993, tax returns with adjusted gross income above 
$75,000 paid 50% of all the income taxes for that year although they accounted for only 
7 percent of the total number of returns filed. See id. at 9. 
I 68. Jerome Hellerstein provides a particularly concise and pithy account of the 
development of the first income tax. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 41. Hellerstein 
describes how that tax, which the Socialist and Populist Parties demanded, was enacted 
in response to the feeling that urban investors and professionals were bearing little of the 
tax burden under state and local tax systems in place during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, while farmers and others in rural areas bore substantial real and 
personal property taxes. The income tax was enacted by a Democratic administration 
against the charge that to enact such a tax amounted to "socialism, communism and 
devilism." Id. at 9. After being declared unconstitutional, the tax was ensconced in the 
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Traditional tax policy has not considered the ways in which tax 
systems can empower. No data on empowerment exists. An examina-
tion of the ways in which tax systems can empower reveals that the 
federal income and employment tax systems, which contribute the bulk 
of the revenue that feeds the federal budget, empower roughly the same 
group: the owners of capital. Under those systems, owners of capital 
enjoy maximum ability to exercise choice in determining the ultimate 
size of their nominal tax bill and to shift the economic burden of that 
bill to someone else. Empowerment analysis reveals, perhaps not 
coincidentally, that centrism is alive and well even today. The federal 
income tax system may look progressive in its distribution of burdens, 
but to the extent that those burdens are affected by the progressive 
distribution of avoidance and burden powers, the system is much less 
progressive than it appears. Analysis of the way in which the system 
distributes its benefits reveals that the centrist alliance that produced the 
system has succeeded in its goal of preserving centrism. 
The analysis of benefits also reveals an even more insidious effect. 
Not only does the benefit that flows from possession of avoidance power 
serve to reduce the overall progressivity of the system, but the benefit 
that flows to the holder of burden power allows the system as a whole 
to hide its burden from those on whose shoulders it eventually falls. 
The failure to discuss the existence and distribution of these powers 
openly and explicitly thus compounds the disenfranchisement of those 
who are denied those powers. The very design of the federal tax system 
supports Professor Stanley's hypothesis that, notwithstanding its claims 
of redistribution, the system serves to perpetuate a centrist agenda. 
Perhaps more insidiously, it also serves to hide its effect and thus to 
prevent debate by those who are affected by it. In short, an analysis of 
the powers conferred by the federal income tax system (as well as by the 
employment tax system) suggests that Nozick was right---to the extent 
that people are permitted individually to exert their will, a seemingly 
Constitution by the 16th Amendment. Professor Hellerstein also recounts that 
Republican party leaders regarded President Taft's submission to Congress of the 16th 
Amendment as a brilliant move designed to respond to the wide popular demand for an 
income tax at little real cost, for they expected that the amendment would fail to garner 
sufficient votes among the states for ratification. They were, of course, wrong. Id. at 
7-15. 
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egalitarian distributional pattern can, over time, be destroyed, or at least 
be precluded from reaching its full egalitarian promise. 169 
Whether centrism should continue to thrive is, of course, an important 
question with which taxpayers should grapple. Empowerment analysis 
should help them to do so. It should help to unmask the ways in which 
tax systems fail to deliver all that they promise and to encourage a fuller 
discussion of the ways in which tax systems affect our lives. The 
language of empowerment is easy to understand. Its costs and benefits 
are readily apparent. As we embark on a serious consideration of 
dramatic alternatives to the federal income tax system, whether they be 
flat taxes,170 consumption taxes,171 a radically altered income 
I 69. See supra note I. I take a progressive tax to be egalitarian in the sense that 
progressivity is conceptually designed to ameliorate inequalities. See MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 23-27 (1988); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax 
Policy for Post-Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and 
Ideal Structure ofa Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 727 (!985) (examining 
entitlement-based arguments for progressivity in the context of a "degressive" dual-rate 
flat tax); Salzyn, supra note 38, at 584-90; see also supra Part Vl.C. That the income 
tax continues to operate progressively, see supra note 167, is testimony to the power of 
a progressive rate structure and frequent change, even when coupled with significant 
amounts of avoidance power. 
170. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) has sponsored a bill---S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (l 995}-which would impose a 20% flat tax on the earned income of individual 
taxpayers and would provide standard deductions ranging ftom $9,500 for individuals 
to $16,500 for married persons filing jointly. An alternative flat tax proposal, co-
sponsored by Rep. Richard Armey (R-Tex.) and Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) would 
also impose a flat tax on individuals' earned income, but would allow more generous 
standard deductions ranging ftom $13, I 00 for individuals to $26,200 for married couples. 
See H.R. 2060, I 04th Cong., I st Sess. (I 995); S. I 050, 104th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1995). 
For a closer look at the Armey/Shelby proposal, see ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN 
RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) (setting forth the flat tax plan upon which both 
the Armey/Shelby, and the Specter, proposals are based); Vernon Hoven, Flat Tax as 
Seen by a Tax Preparer, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 10, 1995), available in LEXIS, 95 
TNT 156-62; Barbara Kirchheimer, Armey Flat Tax Plan Panned by Treasury, 65 TAX 
NOTES 655 (1994). For a closer look at the Specter proposal, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO "FLAT" TAX RATE PROPOSALS (1995). 
For an overview of the merits of flat taxation generally, see Curtis J. Berger, In Behalf 
of a Single-Rate Flat Tax, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 993 (I 985). 
171. Two consumption tax proposals are currently in the drafting stage. Senator 
Richard Lugar (R-lnd.) has proposed a 17% retail sales tax and Senator Sam Gibbons 
(D-Fla.) has proposed a value added tax (VAT), the rate of which has not been 
determined. Neither proposal has yet been fully fleshed out. Although these two 
proposals are explicitly labeled consumption taxes, it is significant to note that both the 
Armey/Shelby and the Specter flat tax proposals are also consumption taxes in that they 
do not tax individual savings. For a look at merits and demerits of consumption taxes 
generally, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VALUE-ADDED TAX AS A NEW 
REVENUE SOURCE, available in Westlaw, 1994 WL 546916; James M. Bickley, The 
Value-Added Tax: Concepts, Issues, and Experience, 47 TAX NOTES 447 (1990); David 
F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX NOTES 383 
(1988); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 
(1992); Michael J. Graetz, Revisiting the Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax Debate, 57 
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tax,1 72 or some combination of the above, 173 we should add questions 
of empowerment to the debate. 174 Only by discussing fully the 
changes in benefits as well as the changes in burdens that would flow 
from any other system of taxation can we purport to engage in a 
thorough analysis of the consequences of change. 
TAX NOTES 1437 (1992); Maclachlan, supra note 160, at Bl; Eric Toder, Comments on 
Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 66 TAX NOTES 2003 (1995); see also William 
H. Morris, A National Debate on VAT: The Gibbons Proposal, 60 TAX NOTES 1259 
(1993). 
172. For example, as part of the Contract with America, Rep. Bill Archer (R-Tex.) 
has introduced H.R. 56, a reformation, but not replacement, of the current income tax 
system. See H.R, 56, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). H.R. 56 would, among other 
things, "amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide all [non-corporate] 
taxpayers with a 50 percent deduction for capital gains." Id. at I (synopsis). The 
Archer proposal has taken its share of criticism. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The GO P's 
Tax Scam, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1994, reprinted in 66 TAX NOTES 611 (1995); 
Harold Pepperell, 'Rush' Exposes the Capital Gains Tax Cut Hoax, 66 TAX NOTES 1200 
(1995). For a look at the distributional effects of Archer's proposal, see Gene Steuerle, 
The Distributional Effects of Tax Changes, 66 TAX NOTES 2027 (I 995). Other reforms 
of the current Code have been proposed. For example, H.R. 980, sponsored by Rep. 
Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), provides credits and deductions to promote education, child 
care, and retirement savings. H.R. 980, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
173. Michael Graetz has proposed a series of particularly intriguing combinations 
that would retain a progressive structure at the top of the income scale, while reducing 
the compliance burden for lower income and some middle class taxpayers. See Graetz, 
supra note I 67, at 1260. 
174. Consider the opportunities for taxpayer choice presented by the two most 
seriously proposed alternatives to the current federal income tax, the flat tax accompa-
nied by an expanded base as in the Armey/Shelby proposal, supra note 170 (eliminating 
all itemized deductions and special exemptions), and the cash flow consumption tax. 
See, e.g., S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (sponsored by Sen. Sam Nunn (R-Ga.) 
and Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)). The Nunn/Domenici proposal would retain 
numerous exemptions, deductions, and credits. For an critique of both alternatives, see 
Sheldon D. Pollack, Consumption Taxes, Flat Taxes, Capital Gains, and Other Tax 
Fantasies, 66 TAX NOTES 577 (I 995). For a closer look at the principles underlying the 
Nunn/Domenici proposal, see Pete V. Domenici, The UnAmerican Spirit of the Federal 
Income Tax, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 273 (I 994). While little in the flatness of rates 
affects the ability of taxpayers to exercise choice, much in the definition of the tax base 
does. Thus, what at least some taxpayers would lose with the expansion of the base is 
the ability to choose to alter their tax liability by engaging in particular kinds of 
behavior. In effect, they would lose some degree of personal autonomy in the 
determination of tax liability. Would they be willing to pay that price, if asked the 
question directly? Perhaps not. Because personal autonomy is an important value and 
because the degree to which it exists can affect the ability of a tax system to accomplish 
any redistributive objective, truth in taxation requires that we begin to employ this more 
comprehensive analysis now. 
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